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Freemasonry and mafia in EU
institutional corruption:
an exclusive JUST Response report from the Dougal Watt Dossier 'Whistleblower' Robert Dougal Watt speaks out “The
committee feels that the link between Cosa Nostra and [Italian] institutions is
mostly through the ‘Massoneria’ [freemasonry]… The fundamental
terrain on which the link between Cosa Nostra with public officials and private
professions was created and reinforced is the Massoneria. The Massoneria
bond serves to keep the relationship continuous and organic. The admission
of members of Cosa Nostra, even at high levels, in Massoneria is not an
occasional or episodical one, but a strategic choice… the Massoneria
associations offer the mafia a formidable instrument to extend their own power,
to obtain favours and privileges in every field; both for the conclusion of big
business and “fixing trials”, as many collaborators with justice have
revealed”. * Mr Michel
HERVÉ Subject:
My letter of 22 April 2002 I.
Introduction Thank you
for your letter of 29 May, which I received on 11 June. For reasons which
I hope from this letter will be clear, and deemed acceptable, I have some
difficulty to disclose my current precise place of residence. I also
recognise that my departure from Luxembourg represents an infringement of the
rules of the institution with regard to sick leave. Again, I hope that the
reasons for this infringement will be clear, and deemed acceptable, upon the
basis of the contents of this letter. For your information I may be
contacted in Scotland, care of Mr ***; fax ***; e-mail ***. This letter
is set out in seven parts. Since the information provided herein is likely
to be entirely unexpected, for the sake of clarity the next part will provide a
summary of the main themes of the letter, each of which will be presented and
discussed in detail in the main sections. However, I feel I should point out straight away – given the nature of the contents of this letter, and given that in my understanding you have been deliberately misled to date regarding my mental state – that neither my doctor in Luxembourg, nor my doctor in Scotland, has diagnosed me as paranoid or in any way, “mad”. I have been prescribed beta-blockers and sleeping pills for stress, and an anti-depressant for anxiety; but both doctors have assured me that stress and anxiety are the rational responses of an individual who finds him/herself in circumstances such as mine. This stress and anxiety arise from much more than worry about holding on to my job and pension entitlements – which I knowingly placed at risk on 22 April; but from concern over the physical well-being of my family and myself – which I did not knowingly place at risk. I will describe these concerns in detail in this letter; since these matters are complex and highly unusual, I regret my letter is rather long. II.
A summary of the main points presented in this letter According to
the Decision cited in the title of my letter of 22 April, I should have
presented the allegations contained therein to OLAF. I did not do so;
giving as my reason, the second concern identified in my letter to Mr Karlsson
of 4 December 2001. That concern related to OLAF’s apparent failure to
follow up potential evidence in respect of a case apparently still classified by
the Belgian police as an unsolved murder. Considered together with other
evidence, as at 22 April I had no faith in OLAF’s willingness to thoroughly
investigate allegations made against senior individuals within the institutions.
I therefore submitted my allegations to the Ombudsman. However, bearing in
my mind that the Court is corrupt – at least, in my perception, and by my
definition of 22 April – and OLAF at best incompetent, I thought it unwise to
assume “third time lucky” with the Ombudsman; I also sent my letter to MEPs.
However, the
transmission of my letter to MEPs was – I believe – sabotaged, via the
simple expedient of an unofficial “post-room delay”. I believe, upon
the basis of evidence to be presented later in this letter, that this
intervention was undertaken by freemasons. With the benefit of hindsight,
I can identify at least three possible reasons why masons should have wished to
sabotage my initiative: a) to protect brother masons in senior positions
in the Court against whom I present allegations in my letter; b) to
protect the institution’s current modus operandi, which provides an
environment in which freemasonry can flourish; and, c) to address the
threat to the reputation of OLAF implied by my letter of 22 April.
The next
section of my letter presents a hypothesis, which brings together and explains
all of the facts known to me, regarding both the death in suspicious
circumstances, and certain post-22 April events in my own case. I should
like to emphasise my letter presents a hypothesis, and not a proof.
Further investigation, as appropriate, would be necessary to confirm key aspects
and obtain essential supporting evidence. Essentially,
I conclude: that contrary to the findings of contemporary official
enquiries, the corrupt Commission head of division who died in 1993 was not a
“lone fraudster”, but one element of a corrupt conspiracy within the
Commission; that he was protected by a more senior corrupt official, probably
Director General [X]; that Mr [X] in turn enjoyed the protection (or at least
non-intervention, which in this context, amounts to the same thing) of both
UCLAF/OLAF and senior Court auditors; that this conspiracy included the Italian
mafia; and that all of the foregoing involved freemasonry. Clearly, the above constitutes a deeply shocking suggestion. It may, at first reading, seem paranoid and absurd. However, the only truly novel aspect of my hypothesis, is to suggest that a linkage exists between certain phenomena which are already known and widely acknowledged. Specifically, the evidence available to me, and which is presented either in my letter of 22 April, or herein, indicates that: the Court’s procedures are vulnerable to abuse, and have been abused; OLAF protects corrupt senior individuals; freemasonry is influential within the institutions; and the mafia is involved, both in freemasonry in general, and in the specific fraud in particular. The hypothesis presented also constitutes a plausible explanation for many occurences which are otherwise – in my opinion – inexplicable. Since to me the hypothesis is credible, I consequently have some concern for my physical well-being. I present this hypothesis to you, as the Secretary General of the Court of Auditors: a) because I consider it my duty as a Court official to do so, regardless of how I am currently perceived by the institution; and b) because I do not wish to be dead. III.
Explanation for unorthodox method of communicating allegations According to
the Decision cited in the title of my letter of 22 April, I should have
presented the allegations contained therein to OLAF. Instead, I presented
my complaint to the Ombudsman, and copied it to c.500 MEP’s (i.e., to all
members of the Budgetary Control Committee, UK MEP’s, and all MEP’s of
surnames c.G-Z). I also promised in my letter to the Ombudsman to provide
further explanation, in due course, for my failure to follow normal procedure; a
promise to date unfulfilled, due to my extended sick leave. During the
period 1999-2001, I constituted the junior half of a small audit team working
full-time on fieldwork for a draft Special Report on the sound financial
management of the Common Organisation of the Market (COM) in raw tobacco.
The relevant documentation featured references to a series of events in 1991-93,
known collectively as the “Quatraro Case”. The affair constituted a
major scandal with high political and press interest, reported on in Court
Special Report 8/93, and led directly to the formation by the Commission of the
internal enquiry body, UCLAF. The
“official” version of the case, as communicated to Mme Theato, Chair of the
Budgetary Control Committee of the European Parliament, can be briefly
summarised. Mr Quatraro, Head of the Commission division responsible for
management of the tobacco market, came under suspicion of having committed
irregularities in the handling of sales of intervention tobacco from public
storage. Some of the irregular transactions took place with companies
allegedly linked to the mafia. Pending the outcome of a detailed
investigation, Mr Quatraro was allocated to another post within DG-Agriculture.
In the midst of this investigation, Mr Quatraro fell from a window of the
Commission building in Rue de la Loi, Brussels, to his death on a pedestrian
escalator in the street below. This event brought the enquiry to an end.
The European Parliament was so concerned by the case that it secured the
creation of UCLAF, to follow up any future cases of suspected internal
corruption. This unit in due course has become the agency, OLAF.
In 2001, the
“tobacco audit” team on mission in Greece, received during audit interview a
series of detailed allegations of fraud and corruption involving Community
funds, presented by two related auditees. The auditees claimed to possess
supporting documentary evidence. One minor allegation related to the
accepted version of the “Quatraro Case”; which in one minor respect was
alleged to be unsound. In
accordance with the formal agreement between the Court and OLAF on the handling
of such allegations, the auditors neither followed up these claims on-the-spot,
nor examined the documentary evidence cited; but merely recorded the allegations
presented, and the individuals’ details, and forwarded these to OLAF for
follow-up, as the competent Community body for handling such matters. Also
as per the formal procedure, some weeks later OLAF provided a formal response to
the Court. Normally, such communications set out the follow-up work done
by OLAF. However in this case, OLAF’s response provided no evidence of
any follow-up having been made of any of the alleged abuses. The OLAF
response covered only the “Quatraro Case”, providing an update on the legal
procedures in Italy and Greece consequent upon Mr Quatraro’s corruption.
The OLAF response did not evidence that the agency had contacted the individuals
who had presented serious allegations of Member State failure to apply Community
law. I endeavoured, on two occasions, to obtain a request from the Court
to OLAF for further information to be provided on the follow-up made of the
allegations forwarded. My hierarchy rejected these proposals.
OLAF’s perception of the “Quatraro Case”, as described in the 2001 letter,
showed no material change from the version communicated to Parliament some years
ago. As I worked
on the tobacco audit I gradually acquired a greater knowledge of the “Quatraro
Case” from those auditors who had worked on the Court’s previous study of
the tobacco COM, made in 1992-93, and who had been investigating the apparent
irregularities at the time of Mr Quatraro’s death. My interest reflected
a wish to familiarise myself with the immediate background to the topic we were
auditing, i.e., the COM reform of 1996-98. However, the more I learned of
the case, the more puzzled and intrigued I became. The closure
of the internal investigation into alleged malpractice upon the death of Mr
Quatraro indicates that the Commission hierarchy believed that Mr Quatraro acted
alone within the institution; “one bad apple”. However, the
“official” version of events omits a number of elements. Firstly,
although following his death much was made by the press of his wealthy
lifestyle, and that he lived in a substantial villa in a fashionable area of
Brussels; in fact Mr Quatraro enjoyed a substantial private wealth, independent
of his income as a Commission official. Mr Quatraro was already wealthy
through marriage, prior to his appointment to the Commission’s tobacco
division. Secondly,
although the value of the transactions which he authorised was substantial, it
is not clear whether he received any correspondingly significant
“improper” payments. Often fraudsters’ unusual income is matched by
unusual expenditure; e.g., heavy gambling – but I understand that the only
“unusual” outgoings of Mr Quatraro which were subsequently identified by
investigators, were donations made to a political party in his state of origin,
Italy. Normally, it is possible for a fraud investigation to identify
either “greed” or “need”. In Mr Quatraro’s case, neither of
these is evident. Thirdly, by
the early 1990’s, Mr Quatraro had long experience of the tobacco sector.
An internal Philip Morris memorandum written in 1985, recording one
executive’s assessment of Mr Quatraro’s knowledge of the local tobacco
market during an official visit to Spain, observed, “he appeared remarkably
well informed on the country” (Mr Vanharn to Mr Hansen, 21.8.85). With
his extensive knowledge of the sector, Mr Quatraro would have been aware that
certain tobacco processing companies in his state of origin were linked to the
mafia. Certainly, press reports following his death linked such companies
to the mafia. So he would have known that if he wanted to engage in fraud,
then he would risk involving himself with the most infamous organised criminals
in Europe. Fourthly,
although it is clearly implied by the “official version” that Mr
Quatraro’s death was a suicide, and this cause was widely reported in the
press at the time; it does not appear to be certain. As I understand it,
the forensic evidence was not decisive, and Belgian police classified the case
as an unsolved murder. Mr
Quatraro’s case is therefore fundamentally odd, if considered as an incident
involving a lone fraudster. If the “official version” is to be
believed: an experienced and knowledgable official did something for no
apparent reason; for no obvious significant gain; with the most high-risk
associates he could have chosen; and died in mysterious circumstances. It
might therefore be concluded, that the investigation into this case should have
given consideration to the possibility that Mr Quatraro did not act alone within
the Commission. The initial
investigation (i.e., the enquiry which was later followed up by UCLAF/OLAF, who
then presented what I have termed the “official version” to Mme Theato) was
ordered by Mr Quatraro’s own superior, Director General [X]. The remit
of this enquiry was explicitly limited to examining the Head of Division’s
actions in carrying out his duties. It did not examine how Mr Quatraro’s
managers had carried out their duties; e.g., verify the adequacy of the
hierarchy’s supervision or control of Mr Quatraro. This investigation
was conducted by a retired former colleague of the Director General, a Mr
Wachter. The
potential for fraud in the tendering/contract award procedure for sales of
intervention tobacco arose due to an inadequate separation of duties at senior
level. Essentially, all the key functions were performed by the Head of
Division. In the cases of sales of other intervention agricultural
products, functions were separated – with final authorisation of sales given
at higher hierarchical levels, ultimately Director General. In the case of
tobacco, Mr Quatraro apparently persuaded his superiors that the tobacco market
was so complex, that only he could be entrusted to run the whole operation.
This is a strange logic for an internal control system. Normally, the
greater the complexity, the higher the risk of error and abuse; and
consequently, the greater is the sophistication of the internal controls adopted
to prevent or detect irregularity. Mr [X] was a very experienced Director
General. Yet in this case, the reverse took place; due to high complexity,
internal controls were weakened, rather than strengthened. According to
the allegation provided to the Court’s auditors in 2001, shortly prior to Mr
Quatraro’s suspension, representatives of most companies in the European
tobacco processing industry had met in the Europa Hotel, Brussels; by this
account, Mr Quatraro’s corruption was not known to the industry at this time.
The companies allegedly decided that since Mr Quatraro’s general handling of
tobacco COM rules was so contrary to their commercial interests, they would
endeavour to secure his transfer to another Commission division. From
audit work on the documentation supporting COM(96)554, the Commission report
which led to COM reform, it is clear that the institution paid close attention
to industry wishes: during the same period of reform preparation when
tobacco growers’ representatives were writing to Mr Fischler to complain about
the Commission’s suspension of consultative joint committees, senior tobacco
processing company and cigarette company executives were writing to senior
officials expressing gratitude for their presence at hospitality events.
In short,
all the facts excluded from the subsequent OLAF/UCLAF case review which was
presented to Mme Theato, are those which – if they had been provided – might
have suggested to the European Parliament that Mr Quatraro did not act alone.
The only facts included in the “official version”, are those which lead the
reader to the conclusion that Mr Quatraro was one “bad apple” acting alone.
As at 22
April, therefore, considerable doubt existed in my mind as to the willingness
and/or ability of OLAF to follow up evidence and/or allegations against
highly-placed individuals in the Community institutions. This unfavourable
perception had been reinforced by my knowledge of OLAF’s handling of a number
of further cases. On the
occasion of a routine fact-finding mission to OLAF in Spring 2001, my team
leader recounted to me the treatment of a case he had been involved in
presenting to OLAF a couple of years’ previously. This evidence related
to the handling of sales of agricultural produce to China; via a
Swiss-registered company acting as intermediary, SGS. (This company is
‘known’ to the Court’s “export refund” unit. Coincidentally, SGS
also has important contracts for the administration of FEOGA expenditure in
Italy.) The evidence in the “China” case indicated the possibility of
a financial irregularity having been committed by Director General [X]. As
per the official procedure governing Court/OLAF relations, this evidence was
presented to OLAF, for further pursuit. However, OLAF’s response, after
some lively discussion, was along the lines of: “Unless you can show me
the official’s bank statement recording a payment from these people, we’re
not doing anything”. Obtaining bank records in such cases is of course a
matter within the competence of OLAF, and not of the Court; no follow-up action
was taken. Two much
less significant incidents, which I include for completeness, are identified
below. In August
2001, as part of my work on the tobacco audit, I identified evidence of serious
breaches of confidentiality by named officials of the Commission, in the period
1980-90. In late 2001, the Court communicated to OLAF such evidence of
wide and deep penetration of Commission services by multinational cigarette
companies. Documentation of such penetration is in the public domain (see
in particular the reports to Philip Morris executives of their European Affairs
Consultant, at www.pmdocs.com; for search,
enter “Author: HEYNIG”). Official documents on the internet include
Commission papers marked “confidential” and “for official use only”;
correspondence between a Commissioner and a Norwegian minister; another letter
bearing a “Cabinet received” stamp; and a record of the Commission Legal
Service’s misgivings over the strength of the institution’s legal basis for
introducing anti-smoking legislation. So intimate was the cigarette
companies’ knowledge of Commission internal affairs, they even knew a
directive had “erroneously” been signed into law, because an attache had
placed a dossier in the wrong pile on a Commissioner’s desk. The
documentation provided to OLAF identified specific senior Commission officials
as the sources of such confidential information. As the named originator
of the Court’s submission, in the event of any follow-up interest by OLAF, I
might have expected to be requested to provide further information. I
received no such request; so far as I am aware, OLAF has expressed no subsequent
interest in this dossier. Although evidence of irregularity in the
internet archive ceases with effect from 1990, it is inherently unlikely that
cigarette company interest in Commission activities actually ceased; it is much
more likely that such interest is simply not recorded in the archive.
OLAF’s lack of interest in pursuing this issue is surprising, since given the
Commission’s on-going legal proceedings in the United States against
multinational cigarette companies, it would clearly be in the companies’
interest to have current knowledge of the Commission Legal Service’s
perception of the strength of the institution’s case. I understand
that several months ago, an allegation was presented to OLAF regarding the
conduct in office of a Member of the Court who has since retired. The
Member had allegedly secured employment contracts for prospective/existing
temporary staff in return for financial reward from those receiving such
contracts. It might reasonably be expected that any thorough investigation
of such an allegation would involve questioning those appointed in consequence
of this Member’s lobbying of the Court Administration, in order to gather
available evidence of any improper activity which might have taken place, or
been suggested. The potential number of beneficiaries from any improper
activity – if it in fact took place – is limited to no more than a single
digit number. One of the first individuals to receive a renewed temporary
contract from the Court’s Administration, at the personal request of the
Member identified, has not been asked to confirm the propriety of a contract
extension which he received, nor asked to confirm that no financial gain was
provided to the Member in return. As an “A” grade appointment, for
twelve months, this contract was worth a substantial amount to the individual
concerned. (In fact, I can confirm that no impropriety occurred in this
case; the extension to the contract related to a requirement to carry out a
specific audit task. I can personally affirm the reliability of the above,
since the individual in question - is me.) I should
like to emphasise that the cases discussed above do not constitute a
“cherry-picked” sample, selected by me to show OLAF in a bad light. In
fact, they represent the totality of my knowledge of OLAF’s work. In
every case in my knowledge involving potential wrong-doing by senior individuals
within the institutions, OLAF has failed to pursue leads in the manner which
might be expected. Accordingly, in placing my career at risk on 22 April,
I considered it unwise to place any reliance on OLAF’s ability or willingness
to pursue in a professional and impartial manner my allegations against the
Court. I also note
that the above observations are entirely consistent with the findings of Mr Paul
Van Buitenen, who – prior to communicating his concerns to the European
Parliament – initially endeavoured to interest UCLAF in the evidence he
possessed of high-level wrong-doing. In his book, “Blowing the
Whistle” (Politico’s Publishing, 2000), Mr Van Buitenen records a series of
instances in which he presented allegations backed by evidence to UCLAF, but
subsequently heard nothing. At pages 56-7: “I contacted Bianchi
[Van Buitenen’s contact at UCLAF] again. He made it clear to me that my
information was not concrete enough for them to start an official investigation.
I was puzzled. How concrete did it have to be? Bianchi told me that
hard and exhaustive evidence was needed before such high-ranking officials could
be investigated. ‘But isn’t an UCLAF investigation supposed to collect
the hard evidence?’, I burst out… Evidently the fraud prevention unit
couldn’t decide for itself when an investigation was necessary… I felt let
down… apparently I had to provide all the evidence cut and dried. That
was not my job…”. Another of Van Buitenen’s colleagues provided
UCLAF with a copy of a damning internal audit report; “However there was
no response from UCLAF. They continued to maintain that they did not have
enough proof to start an investigation” [p65-6]. “Evidently DG-XXII,
DG-XX and UCLAF wanted to keep the dirty washing hidden for as long as possible
– and certainly not bother the people at the top with it. The European
Parliament had been consistently kept in the dark” [p79-80]. “I
reported the irregularities but UCLAF was unwilling to investigate further”
[p121]. “The way the fraud prevention unit worked left a lot to be
desired” [p122]. “Two other DG-XXII officials had already been to
UCLAF earlier that year… I was told by another colleague, Rene Lejeffe, that
he had approached UCLAF several times about irregularities in DG-XXII and he
complained to me that they were not prepared to take any action” [p53].
Mr Van
Buitenen in recent months has presented a fresh set of allegations of high-level
wrong-doing to OLAF. Reportedly, he identified 270 cases of suspected
irregularity, supported by evidence. OLAF has recently announced that it
will pursue just 4 of these cases; all of which relate to suspected
irregularities committed some years ago, during the already-discredited Santer
Presidency of the Commission. I also
considered it unwise to place full reliance on the Ombudsman. Relative to
the depth of my knowledge of OLAF, my knowledge of the Ombudsman on 22 April was
limited to just one incident; but that was entirely negative. At some time
during the period 1998-2000 (I regret I do not have access to documentation
allowing me to be more specific), in response to an initiative of the Ombudsman,
our institution prepared a “Code of Conduct”, to be applicable to all staff
and Members. The Court delegated preparation of a draft Code, initially to
ADAR (technical audit support) and latterly to the Administration: on both
occasions substantial draft texts, based on the international auditing standards
to which the Court publicly adheres, were submitted for consideration. But
both drafts were rejected by the Court; which settled for its own formulation,
so brief and vapid as to be worthless for any practical purpose. Yet this
self-evidently empty document was – at least implicitly – accepted by the
Ombudsman. I deduced from this that the Ombudsman was more interested in
form than in substance, and in being seen to be active rather than in being
effective. Therefore:
given my knowledge of Court corruption; of OLAF inadequacy; and my misgivings
with regard to the efficacy of the Ombudsman; I concluded that if the serious
allegations contained in my letter were to be assured an opportunity of thorough
investigation, then I should also copy it to MEP’s.
IV.
Events subsequent to the sending of my letter of 22 April 2002 On the
morning of 22 April, I delivered my letter plus an attached annex to the
Ombudsman, along with c.20 copies of my letter addressed to individual MEP’s
(mainly members of the Budgetary Control Committee), to the European
Parliament’s internal mail unit, located in the Konrad Adenauer Building,
Luxembourg. I then returned to the Court’s building, and sent a copy of
the letter to all staff via e-mail. I left the building, and went to see
my doctor, who signed me off work for one week. On the morning of 23 April
in Brussels, en route to Scotland, I delivered a further c.480 letters to
MEP’s to the Parliament’s internal mail unit off Rue Wiertz. Given the
nature of the content of these letters and their wide distribution, I
anticipated a fairly swift and significant public reaction. Suffering from
stress, I went off to Scotland to stay with my family, since I live alone in
Luxembourg. (At that time, I regret I was unaware of the rule which
prohibits an official on sick leave from leaving the country of normal
residence.) When no
reaction had arisen by the morning of Wednesday, 24 April, I concluded that it
was possible my letters had been deliberately with-held from MEP’s.
Since interference with MEPs’ mail would be improper, I concluded that any
such action must be unofficial in nature. In my knowledge, the only
unofficial group which could have done the deed – i.e., which possessed the
required staff numbers, influence, co-ordination, rapidity of response, and lack
of accountability – was the freemasons. Freemasonry
is powerful within the European institutions. Within a few weeks of
arriving in the Court in 1995, I was informed from numerous sources that a
significant number of staff, in particular those at a senior level, were
freemasons. Two close colleagues informed me they had been invited to
join, soon after arriving in Luxembourg – they had declined. Freemasonry
is reportedly powerful in the British civil service; however, in my six years in
the UK civil service, I never encountered any indication of freemasonry. I
conclude from this that freemasonry is an even more powerful presence in the
European civil service. I was told that each nationality is organised in a
separate lodge, and feature members from, inter alia, all the European
institutions in Luxembourg – the secretariat of the European Parliament, the
Commission, Court of Justice, European Investment Bank, etc., as well as the
Court of Auditors. Mr Van
Buitenen has also made reference to masonic influence in the Commission.
For example: “Senior staff with sufficient political protection are
often not subject to appropriate disciplinary procedures or are freed of any
further suspicion. Sometimes, astonishing details about the proceedings in
the disciplinary investigations as well as the administrative enquiries come to
the surface. One example is that of an official who, at a certain point
during an interrogation, refused to continue speaking without first consulting
his Godfather (‘Parrain’). Further informal enquiries made by me,
seemed to confirm the existence of a Masonic lodge of which this official, as
well as several other very senior staff, appeared to be a member”
(“Blowing the Whistle”, p251-2). I concluded
that if the freemasons had intercepted my letter, it could only be because I had
offended their interests. This caused me great concern. Since the
freemasons are unaccountable, I feared that even if I were officially vindicated
in my exposure of corruption in the Court, unofficial sanctions might yet be
applied. I became very anxious because of this. I re-read my
letter in order to try to identify the cause of any masonic offence. I
could find none in my criticism of the Court; in my experience, masons and
non-masons alike express concern over the situation in the institution.
Then I concluded, to my horror, that if the freemasons had seized my letter –
it might be because they wished to prevent information coming to light about
OLAF’s failure to follow up a suspected murder case with links to the Italian
mafia. I wondered why this should concern the masons. And then,
“the penny dropped”. All that which had puzzled and intrigued me about
the “Quatraro Case”, for so long turning over in the back of my mind, became
readily explicable – if one assumed the existence of a masonic dimension to
that case (a thesis discussed in detail in the following section of this
letter). I started to worry about a great deal more than my pension
entitlements. I entered a state of shock, from which I have yet to emerge.
It has taken me several weeks to write this letter, to present my thoughts in an
even reasonably coherent manner; the implications of my hypothesis on the
“Quatraro Case” are so deeply disturbing. On 22 April,
it was my intention to raise awareness of corruption within my institution.
It was not my intention to launch a one-man crusade against freemasonry.
The idea never entered my head. Therefore on 25 April, in order to address
the possibility of masonic involvement, I telephoned my friend, and the one
individual in the Court whom I know with certainty to be a freemason, since some
months ago he invited me to consider applying; Mr [R]. After normal
preliminaries, I informed Mr [R] that my action had not been intended to
transgress any interests of the freemasons. Mr [R] responded that
freemasons are law-abiding and do good work. I replied that I could see
the possibility of a masonic dimension in the “Quatraro Case”; and that I
had no desire to rake up that case, since I did not want to undermine my
position or well-being. Mr [R] told me he had no idea what I was talking
about, and advised me to seek counselling. During the course of this
conversation, Mr [R] asked me where I was, and I told him I was telephoning from
Scotland. The next
day, I telephoned the Ombudsman’s office. I was informed that my letter
to him, delivered in Luxembourg on 22 April, had arrived in Strasbourg on 25
April. I was temporarily relieved that not all my letters had been
“disappeared”. On Saturday,
27 April, en route to Luxembourg to see my doctor again, I received a telephone
message from Mr [R], recorded on 26 April, indicating that he wished to talk
with me urgently. We arranged to meet at his home. On Sunday, 28
April, we met and conversed for around an hour, without witnesses. Mr [R]
informed me that immediately following our telephone conversation on 25 April,
he had contacted your office. He added that you had then interrupted your
participation in a Court meeting, in order to discuss his conversation with me.
Mr [R] stated that the next day, you had been persuaded to invite OLAF to
investigate the allegations presented in my letter. Mr [R] expressed his
approval of this initiative. He also told me that he had written a note to
you, recording his conversation with me. According to his note, I had
stated I was in Scotland; and I had expressed concern about being persecuted by,
“dark forces”. This term implies belief in persecution by supernatural
or satanic powers, active in the physical world. In fact – as Mr [R]
well understood at the time of our telephone conversation – I spoke about the
possibility that I, or my family, might be victimised in some way by freemasons,
in response to my initiative of 22 April. Mr [R] asked
me, “How did you know the letters hadn’t been delivered?”. The
auditor in me carefully noted this phrasing; the question was not, “What makes
you think the letters haven’t been delivered?”. I replied that if they
had been, I would have expected some sort of public reaction, given the
contents; and it seemed to me remarkable, that although the Ombudsman had
confirmed receipt of my letter in Strasbourg on 25 April (i.e., 3 days after
delivery in Luxembourg), in the same delay my letters to MEPs had not moved from
the basement of the Brussels Parliament building to the MEPs’ offices
upstairs. Mr [R] smiled, and informed me of a conversation he had held
with you, shortly after my e-mail of 22 April. Mr [R]’s account of that
conversation ran as follows: [R]:
You know, I think it would be best if those letters weren’t delivered to MEPs. I understood
from the above that Mr [R], via masonic contacts in the European Parliament’s
administration, had secured the non-delivery of my letters to MEPs. (I
know two freemasons in the Parliament’s Luxembourg secretariat: […].)
I also understood that Mr [R] wanted me to know that he had secured the
non-delivery of my letters to MEPs. Most
chillingly, I also deduced from my conversation with Mr [R] that the timely
delivery of my letter to the Ombudsman had been freely permitted. I
consequently deduced from this that the Ombudsman represents for the freemasons
a “safe pair of hands” to deal with my allegations. Mr [R] then
advised me to come to work on Monday, 29 April, in order to: a) plead I had been
insane on 22 April; and b) to deliver a short note, for the attention of the
Parliament’s administration, requesting the withdrawal of my letters to MEPs
of the previous week. By 28 April,
it might be reasonably assumed that my letters had already been delivered –
except by someone who knew the letters had actually been intercepted. And
the “short note” was to be addressed to the EP administration; i.e., the
purpose of the note was to cover the risk for Parliament staff of an MEP asking
Parliament officials at any later date why s/he had not received my letter.
Mr [R] also
emphasised that I should give this note to you on the morning of 29 April.
The significance of this timing did not strike me until later; the Staff
Committee election results were scheduled to be announced at noon on 29 April. I believe if
I had followed Mr [R]’s advice, and presented a plea of insanity along with a
retraction on the morning of 29 April, then my letters to MEPs would never have
been delivered. Even if a copy of my letter did subsequently reach public
attention (e.g., via a “leak” by one of my colleagues of the e-mail version
of my letter), it would have been discredited by an “admission” of insanity
and a note of retraction. However,
beyond the deadline of 29 April, it would have become difficult for Parliament
staff to convincingly attribute the non-delivery of my letters to any routine
“mail-room delay”. And it was predictable that the likelihood of a
retraction would diminish, when I became aware of the strength of support from
colleagues. My letters to MEPs were delivered on 29 April. The point
which convinces me that Mr [R] acted contrary to my best interests, lies in his
written communication to you that I was in Scotland. Until that time, the
Court’s Administration had no firm information on my precise location, other
than that I was absent on sick leave. I understand that a visit was made
to my home; but I might have simply been out to the pharmacist. It was
from Mr [R] that I became aware of the rule which prohibits an official from
leaving his country of residence during sick leave without the permission of his
institution. I realised during our conversation that the submission of a
written note by Mr [R], recording my location, permitted a procedure to be
initiated against me for failing to obtain written permission for leaving
Luxembourg. At the same time as covertly sabotaging my initiative, Mr [R]
presented himself as my friend, offering to represent me in disciplinary
proceedings. This experience was deeply disorienting. As Mr Schmitt
can attest, by the next day, 29 April, I was extremely distressed; and
sufficiently frightened to be willing to sign a note of retraction.
However, I was too upset to write such a note. Within five minutes of
telephoning Mr Schmitt, I was on a train to Brussels en route to Scotland.
I believe
the holding of my letters until 29 April also served a further purpose.
For the week 22-26 April, MEPs were in session in Brussels. But they then
left for a ‘constituency week’, 29 April-3 May; most of my letters therefore
arrived in empty offices. In that
week, a “media spin” took place which minimised the impact of my letter.
There is no evidence of any “supporter” of mine talking to the press, at any
time; and there would have been no purpose in any “supporter” of mine
leaking my letter to the press, since staff assumed my letter had already
reached MEPs. Both the “European Voice” and “The Sunday Times”
sensationalised my allegations, by focussing almost exclusively on the claims of
sexual harrassment and nepotism, and the institution’s denials of both.
Neither publication recorded the detailed allegations of serious mismanagement.
Post-22
April developments suggest that my original assessments of both OLAF and the
Ombudsman were sound. OLAF has informed me that its investigators would
even be prepared to visit me in Scotland. On the basis of my knowledge of
OLAF’s work, and given my implicit criticism of the agency in my letter of 22
April, I conclude that OLAF’s primary intent is to improperly discredit my
allegations. The
Ombudsman’s treatment of my complaint is certainly consistent with my initial
assessment. As noted in my letter of 22 April, my original intention was
to identify further supporting evidence in private to the Ombudsman. I
wished to avoid causing public embarrassment to individuals and Community
organisations. When I
telephoned the Office of the Ombudsman to confirm his receipt of my complaint, I
was informed – by Mr Harden, the official dealing with the case – that the
Ombudsman’s procedure is to invite a preliminary response from the institution
which is the subject of allegations; and then to invite the individual who
submitted the allegations to provide supporting evidence, and/or comment on the
preliminary response of the institution. However, in my case, this has not
happened. Instead, the Ombudsman has decided to reject out of hand all
aspects of my complaint; even though certain of my allegations at least were
detailed and specific. Furthermore,
contrary to the indication given in the Ombudsman’s letter, I did not waive
“confidentiality” in respect of the supporting dossier to my complaint.
I am appalled by this suggestion, which I consider to be absurd. This
whole affair began because I sought to protect the confidentiality of the
undercover operation, from the improper decision of Mr [S]. However, in
conclusion, I should like to emphasise that I consider the issue of the
“mail-room delay”, in and of itself, to be of minor significance. It
delayed my letters; gave me cause for alarm; and reduced the initial impact of
my allegations. But fundamentally, it has altered nothing. I believe
the real significance of this incident, lies in the context of the hypothesis to
be presented in the following section. That is: for those non-masons
who already believe, or suspect, that the late delivery of my letters was not
“accidental”; the credibility of the following hypothesis will be
significantly raised. V.
Hypothesis: the “Quatraro Case”, and more recent events I wish to
emphasise that this section of my letter constitutes a hypothesis. The
evidence presented does not constitute a proof. The hypothesis does,
however, explain the known facts; and it is the only explanation I can identify
which does account for all those facts. As I perceive it, the hypothesis
has value as a guide to further investigative work; it should not be interpreted
as a substitute for that investigative work. The
hypothesis: The “Quatraro Case” in particular, the attitude of
OLAF to high-level wrong-doing in general, and the post-22 April events in my
own case discussed above, may best be interpreted as reflecting the
manifestation of improper influence by freemasons within and between the
European Institutions and with third parties (in the “Quatraro Case”, the
mafia). The aim of masonic influence is not only to protect and promote
individual freemasons and those non-masons useful to freemasonry, but to
preserve the current modus operandi of the institutions. This modus
operandi is characterised primarily by a lack of transparency and a lack of
accountability, which provide an excellent environment in which freemasonry
itself may flourish, and thereby give aid and support to freemasonry in the
wider society. The
presentation of this hypothesis requires a detailed examination of the
“Quatraro Case”. Although the
Court of Auditors has claimed the credit for unearthing the alleged fraud in the
Commission tobacco division, this claim is unfounded. The credit belongs
to a Commission Clearance of Accounts inspector, Mr [O], who on mission in Italy
found a letter purporting to bear his signature, which he realised had
been forged by Mr Quatraro. The inspector subsequently raised the matter
in Brussels; it was this action which set in motion a train of events resulting
in the suspension of Mr Quatraro from his post in the tobacco division. When the
matter was brought to his attention, DirectornGeneral [X] ordered an enquiry.
This was undertaken by a former personal colleague of his; and its the remit was
explicitly limited to Mr Quatraro’s activities. The consequent enquiry
report has never been released by the Commission. The Court’s review in
1992-93 of the Commission’s initial investigation was led by two officials
well known within our institution to be freemasons: Mr [H], Head of
Division (now Director), and Mr [R], Principal Auditor (now Head of Division).
Mr [R] was
permitted by the Commission to read the enquiry report, in a sealed room, but he
was not permitted to make photocopies. In 2000, I repeatedly endeavoured
to persuade my hierarchy that the Court should formally request a copy of the
report; without success. The reasons
given to me as to why the Court did not follow up in 1992-93 the possibility
that Mr Quatraro did not act alone, are that there is nothing in the enquiry
report of any interest (Mr [R]), and that Mr Quatraro’s family has already
suffered enough (Mr [H]). The Quatraro family are certainly tragic figures
in this very sad affair. Subsequent to Mr Quatraro’s death, his son
committed suicide. Nevertheless,
I find the lack of Court follow-up in 1992-93, and the reasons given, to be
strange. Both Mr [H] and Mr [R] are highly vigorous, competent and
respected auditors within the Court. Yet the risk that Mr Quatraro did not
act alone is clear. All the facts excluded from the “official version”
are those which – if they had been provided – would have suggested that Mr
Quatraro did not act alone. The only facts included in the “official
version”, are those which imply Mr Quatraro acted alone. A finding that
Mr Quatraro may not have been the principal, and was perhaps even coerced into
his role, might be expected to lessen the suffering of his family.
For the
reasons identified earlier, it is inherently unlikely that the Head of Division
was the principal behind the alleged fraud. In this context, I consider it
inexplicable that questions were not put to the senior official who had
authorised a unique internal control procedure for sales of intervention tobacco
held in storage. The procedure authorised by Director General [X]
effectively “took him out of the loop”. In fact, if not in intent,
this secured him deniability for any subsequent wrong-doing by the Head of
Division. The
apparently “untouchable” status of Director General [X] is confirmed by the
case concerning sales to China. In this case, Mr [H] supported by my
future Team Leader, argued vigorously with OLAF over the need for a detailed
investigation of the case. At first consideration, the vigour of Mr
[H]’s pursuit of this case seems inconsistent with the earlier suggestion that
he had “backed off” from investigating Mr [X]’ potential involvement in
the “Quatraro Case”. However, the auditor who had identified possible
impropriety in this case, and who had gathered a dossier of evidence to support
his conclusions, was not Mr [H], but my Team Leader. The latter is an
extremely dogged investigator; and when confronted by hierarchical rejection of
his work on unsound grounds, has repeatedly shown himself prepared to take
matters to higher authorities. Mr [H] could not have simply ignored my
Team Leader’s evidence; he had to be seen to act upon them. The normal
procedure for communicating such evidence to OLAF is via formal written
submission. However, this would have established an internal record of my
Team Leader’s findings; would have brought these findings to the attention of
the Court’s senior hierarchy; and would have required OLAF to present a formal
written response, detailing follow-up work done and/or written reasons as to why
the agency did not consider the findings worthy of formal investigation. My Team
Leader’s findings were not sent in writing to OLAF. Mr [H] chose instead
to visit OLAF in Brussels, accompanied by my Team Leader, in order to
communicate the findings orally. The liveliness of the exchange of views
at that meeting is irrelevant. The key point is the outcome of this
meeting; which was that neither the Court nor OLAF took any further action in
following up the evidence of Mr [X]’ culpability identified by my Team Leader. Unusually,
the dossier of evidence itself was not returned to my Team Leader.
Instead, it has remained in the personal possession of Mr [H], who has kept it
– unique among former case files – throughout his subsequent internal
transfers from Head of Division FEOGA2, to Director-FEOGA, Director-ADAR, and
currently again Director-FEOGA. So the
question arises: What prevented Mr [H] and Mr [R], and later UCLAF/OLAF,
from following up the evident risk of Mr [X]’ involvement in irregularity?
As noted in
my letter of 22 April in the context of Mrs Cresson’s dentist, audit enquiries
into the activities of senior individuals are not always authorised by the
Court, even where allegations surface of a serious nature. However, in the
“Quatraro Case”, the auditors had already received full authorisation from
the Court to examine the Commission’s handling of the tobacco COM; approval
had been given to audit the COM well before allegations of impropriety were
presented by Mr [O]. The responsible Member for the 1993 report was Mr
Androutsopoulos, who apparently took little interest in this work. (Reportedly,
he only commented on the draft report at the Group reading stage, when he
astonished other Members by stating, “I don’t agree with my division’s
report”; to which other Members, impressed by its quality, replied, “Too
bad, you presented it”.) The auditors therefore had had full opportunity to
examine Mr [X]’ actions in detail; if they had wished. There is no
evidence of either official being requested by the Court hierarchy to “go
easy” on a high-ranking Commission official. The same considerations
apply to UCLAF/OLAF; even if allegations against high-ranking individuals are
seldom acted upon, a case involving the death of a senior official which
attracted press coverage would need by the Commission itself to be seen to be
thoroughly investigated – and the Parliament was keenly interested in the
case. The lack of
follow-up must be attributed to either accident (i.e., incompetence) or design
(i.e., deliberate decision not to investigate). Given the high reputation
of both Mr [H] and Mr [R] in the Court, and the fact that UCLAF/OLAF has had ten
years to investigate the most important case in its history, it must be
concluded that both Messrs [H] and [R] and UCLAF/OLAF have taken conscious
decisions not to investigate the role of Mr [X]. Since the
non-investigation of Mr [X] makes no sense in the context of the known facts of
the case, it follows that we must look further in order to identify the
motivation of both Mr [H]/Mr [R] and UCLAF/OLAF. With regard
to Mr [H]/Mr [R], the only fact external to the “Quatraro Case” in my
knowledge, which could theoretically be sufficiently important to cause such a
non-investigation, is their freemasonry. The first working assumption of
the hypothesis, therefore, is that the motive underlying the failure of the
Court’s auditors to investigate Mr [X], was masonic; i.e., Mr [X] was a
brother freemason. Stephen
Knight’s, “The Brotherhood” – a popular work published in 1983, but
highly influential, and the most authoritative source I have been able to
identify in my current circumstances – observes, “Freemasonry remains a
power to be reckoned with in many European countries, France and Germany in
particular. The French Grand Master today is Air Force General Jacques
Mitterand, the President’s brother, and freemasonry’s influence in politics
is profound. Francois Mitterand owes much of his success in the 1981
election to influential freemasons… According to Fred Zeller, Grand Master of
the Grand Orient of France in 1971 and 1973, the 1974 presidential election
would have been won by the Socialists had Valery Giscard d’Estaing not become
a freemason and colluded with sympathetic forces in the Brotherhood, which
eventually persuaded French freemasons that it was in their best interests to
vote for Giscard. He was initiated into the Franklin Roosevelt Lodge in
Paris the year of the election” [p32-33]. Other sources corroborate the
importance of freemasonry in the higher echelons of French public service. Given this
context, it is reasonable to hypothesise that France would have desired to see a
freemason as the most senior French official in Brussels. In order to
maintain the hypothesis with regard to UCLAF/OLAF, it becomes necessary to
identify a corresponding cause for the agency’s non-investigation of Mr [X].
This may be deduced from three events. In March
2002, Mr [R] informed me that the widely-discussed story in the Court that a
Member was under investigation by OLAF for “selling jobs”, was false.
Mr [R] stated that in fact, OLAF had received no complaint. He asserted
that the origin of the rumour was an article in a low-circulation German
magazine. The article had reached the attention of the Court; but since
the German national media had failed to pick up on the story, it was unlikely
that any more would be heard about it. I responded rather abruptly that
several of my sources indicated OLAF had received a complaint. Unusually,
Mr [R] did not dispute the point, but changed the subject. I believe
the story which Mr [R] told me is fictitious; and that the purpose of this
fiction, was to “launder” the reputation of OLAF in this affair. By
taking OLAF out of the story, OLAF ceases to be responsible for failing to find
concrete evidence of the Member’s alleged corruption. Thus, I reach the
conclusion that Mr [R] seeks by improper means to protect OLAF. [It has
since been confirmed to me by a third party source that OLAF did indeed receive
a very detailed and evidenced complaint in early 2002, via the European
Parliament. R D Watt] Furthermore,
I believe post-22 April events reinforce the credibility of a freemason/OLAF
link. From Mr [R]’s account, the Court had to be persuaded to invite
OLAF to investigate my allegations within the institution. Given that to
the best of my knowledge my allegations are sound and might be endorsed as such
by an impartial investigation, such reluctance is understandable. The
invitation to OLAF only makes sense, if the Court received prior assurances as
to OLAF’s normal method of investigating allegations made against
highly-placed individuals. Thirdly, the
actions of Mr [H] suggest that his links with OLAF are close. My 280-page
submission to the Ombudsman records in its early pages my endeavours to secure
the transmission to OLAF of evidence of cigarette company penetration of
Commission services. My FEOGA hierarchy did not agree. Mr [H] –
then Director-ADAR, and responsible for Court-OLAF relations – arranged for me
to meet with Mr Bruner, the Director-OLAF, during one of his periodic visits to
the Court, in order that I might communicate my evidence and concerns directly
to him, without informing my own hierarchy. (After reflecting, I backed
out of this arrangement, since I wished to pursue my dispute with my hierarchy
through official channels, and did not want to embarrass anybody or act without
the knowledge or permission of my managers. Shortly thereafter, Mr [H]
communicated officially to my hierarchy that OLAF had expressed a general
interest in the topic of cigarette company penetration of Commission services;
and had requested the dossier which my hierarchy had earlier refused to send.)
From this, I deduce that Mr [H] and OLAF are close; and that both are content to
operate via non-official channels. The
hypothesis’ second assumption, derived from the above, is that the
decision-making hierarchy of OLAF is also masonic. In my perception, only
this explains why UCLAF/OLAF did not pursue the “Quatraro Case” or the
“China” case; why freemason Mr [R] should use false means to protect
OLAF’s reputation; why freemason Mr [H] – in normal circumstances, a very
correct official – should be prepared to engage with OLAF via non-official
channels; and why Mr [R] should have been so content that the Court had been
persuaded to invite OLAF to investigate my allegations. It should
not be understood from the above that I perceive freemasons to be
“everywhere” in the institutions. Rather, it would make sense for an
organisation committed to secrecy, and mutual aid for its members, to
concentrate its endeavour on placing “brothers” in positions of influence
within the Community’s control bodies. Once in place, such persons can
secure the appointment of other “brothers” at more junior level, to
implement measures to benefit freemasonry, and to secure the succession.
Most importantly, since the Court and OLAF constitute the ultimate control
bodies for external and internal wrong-doing respectively, influence/control
over the Court and OLAF would permit freemasonry to ensure protection of every
brother mason working in the institutions. This would be highly desirable
for an organisation in which members engage in such activities as attributing
false statements to others and intercepting mail. If Director
General [X] is a freemason, then this can explain: the Commission’s
failure to pursue its own investigation beyond the death of Mr Quatraro
(responsible: Mr [X]); why both Messrs [H]/[R] and UCLAF/OLAF did not pursue the
obvious risk of Mr [X]’ involvement in the “Quatraro Case”; why Mr [H] did
not submit the “China” case in writing; why OLAF refused to investigate the
“China” case; why UCLAF/OLAF failed to provide full information on the
“Quatraro Case” to Mme Theato; and why the Court did not challenge the
completeness of the account given to Mme Theato. It would be
consistent with the hypothesis, if Mr Quatraro was also a freemason. In my
perception, this would explain both why Mr Quatraro acted in the manner in which
he did, and why all follow-up of his death was so superficial. However, it
is not essential to the viability of the hypothesis to assume that Mr Quatraro
was a freemason; it is conceivable that he could have been
coerced/manipulated/bribed into corrupt acts by his hierarchical superior, Mr
[X]. Mr Quatraro
was already wealthy, does not seem to have profited (and if he did, he gave it
away as political donations), and in dealing with very dangerous associates, he
took huge risks (presumably for his family in Italy, as well himself). It
is not likely that Mr Quatraro’s corruption resulted from intimidation by the
mafia – no hint of corrupt behaviour is associated with any previous or
subsequent head of the tobacco division. And no-one in his position, with
his knowledge, would have trusted in a bilateral deal with companies which he
must have known were linked to the mafia. He would have known that
involvement in any bilateral deal would have been certain to expose him to
future blackmail, extortion and worse. A bilateral deal with a relative,
or a very trusted friend, is conceivable – but a bilateral deal with the most
notorious criminals in Europe? Such
behaviour was only logical – and the evidence is that Mr Quatraro was in full
possession of his faculties, at least until his final day – if Mr Quatraro
believed that he enjoyed some form of “protection”. That is,
before beginning the fraud, Mr Quatraro must have believed that he would be
safeguarded by some third party or parties. In this
context, Mr Quatraro would have known that he needed hierarchical support within
the institution – or at least, some assurance of non-intervention – given
the unorthodox nature of the financial practices he would be engaging in over an
extended period of time. From the later investigation, it seems that the
character of the corruption would have immediately aroused suspicions by an even
casual review of the contract award documentation (e.g., “competing” bids
featured identical hand-writing, and were recorded as being received within a
few minutes of each other, at the same location). Such inept fraud
suggests Mr Quatraro was very inexperienced and/or confident. The most
obvious likely source for such hierarchical support is Mr [X], since it was he
who authorised the unique sales procedure for tobacco. However, even a
trilateral deal would not have been viable; it would similarly have exposed Mr
[X], as well as Mr Quatraro, to future blackmail and extortion by the mafia.
It is
necessary, then, if the hypothesis is to be viable, to identify a reason why the
“Commission” side of the corrupt deal-making should trust in the “mafia”
side; i.e., a reason why the “Commission” side could believe that it
was safe to engage in a corrupt deal with the most notorious criminals in
Europe, without risk of being compromised at a later date. The only reason
which I can identify as conceivable, is that the deal was mediated, sanctioned
and endorsed via masonic guarantee. If it is the
case that the corrupt deals between Mr Quatraro and tobacco processing companies
were masonic in nature, then all the events described above become readily
explicable. But is it credible, that senior public servants in the early
1990’s could become involved with the Italian mafia? An
Italian Parliamentary enquiry (Commissione Parlamentare d’inchiesta sul
fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali, Relazione sui
rapporti tra mafia e politica, p59, Rome, 1993; quoted in Umberto Santino,
“Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe against mafia and organised crime”,
p13), reached this conclusion: “The
committee feels that the link between Cosa Nostra and [Italian] institutions is
mostly through the ‘Massoneria’ [freemasonry]… The fundamental
terrain on which the link between Cosa Nostra with public officials and private
professions was created and reinforced is the Massoneria. The Massoneria
bond serves to keep the relationship continuous and organic. The admission
of members of Cosa Nostra, even at high levels, in Massoneria is not an
occasional or episodical one, but a strategic choice… the Massoneria
associations offer the mafia a formidable instrument to extend their own power,
to obtain favours and privileges in every field; both for the conclusion of big
business and “fixing trials”, as many collaborators with justice have
revealed”. The most
spectacular case involving masonic subversion of Italian national institutions
was the “P2” conspiracy, which came to light in 1981. The activities
of Lodge P2 gave rise to Italy’s biggest post-war scandal; the conspiracy’s
corruption, blackmail, murder and sheer scale rocked the Italian establishment
and brought down the government. The
defenders of freemasonry – Mr [R] and I discussed this case – maintain
that P2 constituted “irregular” masonry; consequently, it is improper to
tarnish “mainstream” freemasonry with P2 association. However, a 1984
Italian parliamentary report, “Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare
d’Inchiesta sulla Loggia Massonica P2”, reached a less sanguine assessment
(reported in Martin Short’s “Inside the Brotherhood” of 1990, the
follow-up to Knight’s work, p543 et seq): P2 represented a secret,
elite lodge approved at the highest level by the national masonic association,
the Grand Orient; which was itself recognised by other national associations,
including Britain’s Grand Lodge. P2,
established in 1877 but moribund with only 14 members in the mid-1960’s, was
revived and developed by former Grand Master Gamberini “as a nexus for the
Italian Right to seize control of Italian society, if the need arose”; by
1980, under its Venerable Master Licio Gelli, it had over a thousand members,
drawn from the highest strata of Italian society. Some members joined
because of commitment to the lodge’s aims; “Others joined the Lodge because
Gelli used ruthless blackmail. The ‘masonic dues’ Gelli extracted from
the brethren of Lodge P2 were not primarily financial. What the Venerable
Master demanded – and got – were secrets: official secrets which he
could use to consolidate and extend his power, and personal secrets he could use
to blackmail others into joining his Lodge. This most sensitive
information from all areas of government was passed to him by his members, who
seem to have obeyed him with unquestioning devotion… In 1976 [non-P2 mason]
Francesco Siniscalchi, made a statement at the office of the Rome Public
Prosecutor, alleging that Gelli was involved in criminal activities. He
was ignored, partly because of Gelli’s already formidable reputation, which
intimidated two officers responsible for processing the complaint. Soon
after this, Gelli came to the attention of the police after his friend and P2
member Michele Sindona, Italy’s most influential private banker, had fled to
the United States leaving financial chaos behind him. Sindona [was] widely
believed to have links with the mafia… Meanwhile in Italy magistrates were
still investigating Sindona’s fraudulent activities and also the events behind
the murder of the liquidator of his financial empire… Milan magistrates
ordered a police raid on [Gelli’s] villa outside Arezzo… Among the documents
left behind at the abandoned villa were the membership files of P2. A list
of members drawn up by Gelli contained the names of nearly a thousand of
Italy’s most powerful men. One prosecutor’s report later stated:
‘Lodge P2 is a secret sect that has combined business and politics with the
intention of destroying the country’s constitutional order.’ Among the
names were three members of the cabinet including Justice Minister Adolfo Sarti;
several former Prime Ministers..; 43 MPs; 54 top civil servants; 183 army, navy
and air force officers including 30 generals and 8 admirals; 19 judges; lawyers;
magistrates; carabiniere; police chiefs; leading bankers; newspaper proprietors,
editors and journalists; 58 university professors; the leaders of several
political parties; and even the directors of the three main intelligence
services. All these men, according to the files, had sworn allegiance to
Gelli, and held themselves ready to respond to his call. The 953 names
were divided into 17 groupings, or cells, each having its own leader. P2
was so secret and so expertly run by Gelli that even its own members did not
know who belonged to it. Those who knew most were the 17 cell leaders and
they knew only their own grouping” (Knight, p269-278). Francesco
Siniscalchi’s reward from internationally-recognised Italian freemasonry, for
his attempt to expose P2 illegality, was expulsion. The 1984
parliamentary enquiry, discussed in Short, p532 et seq, found “Gelli hosted
frequent P2 meetings where the politics of destabilisation and subversion were
discussed by police chiefs, army generals, security service bosses and appeal
court judges. He knew this was not orthodox freemasonry: ‘Philosophy has
been banished, but we felt we had to do this in order to tackle only solid and
concrete arguments affecting national life’… [and in a note to absent
members of P2, Gelli stated] ‘Many have asked… how we should behave if
one morning we awoke to find the clerico-Communists had seized power, whether it
would be best to resign ourselves to passive acquiescence, or to take on
well-defined positions – and if so, on the basis of what emergency plan’”
[p543]. “The 1970s were some of the blackest years in the history of
modern Italy. The state was torn apart by left- and right-wing terror, but
many of the horrific acts originally blamed on the Left (from the Red Brigades
to the Communist Party) turned out to be acts of black propaganda by the extreme
Right. These included the ‘Italicus’ train bombing in 1974, in which
12 people were killed, and the 1980 Bologna Station massacre in which 85 died.
In both events P2 had a guiding control…” [p545]. The P2 case
demonstrates how freemasonry’s respectability, secrecy and routine engagement
in covert activities can be used by the unscrupulous as “cover” for corrupt
activities. It should be
appreciated that the investigation of P2 was partial and short-lived, and many
of its participants remained powerful figures in public life. Some former
P2 Lodge members, such as Silvio Berlusconi, have risen to even higher levels.
(Another member was Mr Gaetano Vita, identified on the P2 membership list as
ispettore caporipartizione foreste del ministero dell’Agricultura; I seem to
remember this name from sector letters which the Court sent to Italy
(addressee?), in respect of “tobacco audit” missions.) The P2
affair also demonstrates how rank-and-file freemasons can be misled by their own
hierarchies, as to other masons’ earlier wrong-doing. In March 1987 the
English freemasons’ magazine “Masonic Square” incorrectly described the P2
lodge as “bogus… a spurious body not affiliated in any way to the Grand
Orient” [Short, p548]. The same absence of openness and accountability
which is one of freemasonry’s great strengths vis-à-vis the “profane”
(non-masonic) world, is also one of its greatest internal weaknesses.
Freemasonry
has also been a feature of less spectacular corruption than P2. A major UK
public sector corruption scandal of the 1980’s, involving the Property
Services Agency, featured masonic links between key participants, and
demonstrates the corrupting effect which freemasonry can have on previously
law-abiding officials. “In six successive trials a total of 19 public
officials and contractors were convicted of fraud. Four belonged to the
same masonic lodge… The key witness was Michael Hearn, a builder who was also
a mason. In 1967 he joined the Queenswood Lodge [which] had long been a
hive of men in the building trade, but by the early 1980’s it had become a
honeypot for both contractors and civil servants. One contractor was
60-year-old Hearn who now says the only way to get work from the PSA was ‘by
bribing the civil servants and by ringing [inflating] the contracts’.
Hearn invited another builder named King… He brought along a PSA
technical officer, Eric Wenborn. King introduced Wenborn to Hearn who
encouraged him to join the lodge. He was initiated in 1981, and King
joined a few months later. The contractors now had the civil servant just
where they wanted him. By October 1983 Wenborn was flying off to Las
Vegas, all expenses paid by a crooked Queenswood brother… In June 1988 Wenborn
pleaded guilty to five charges of corruption and conspiracy to obtain bribes.
He was jailed for two years… he had worked incorruptibly for thirty-five years
until he joined freemasonry” [Short, p524]. The above
texts are not intended to suggest “guilt by association”; but to demonstrate
how freemasonry can be used to arrange and sustain the most daring and ambitious
types of fraud and illegality. In respect
of the “Quatraro Case”; if the tobacco division’s corrupt deals were
masonic in nature, then all of the events which took place can be explained.
According to the hypothesis: The
motivation of Mr Quatraro becomes explicable. He can now be viewed as a
pawn, rather than a principal. He did not initiate the fraud. He was
not skilled in fraud; he acted in response to instruction, from his hierarchical
superior. He was confident no harm would come to him; he anticipated
protection in return. The
motivation of Mr [X] becomes explicable. He sought to generate funds by
masonic means; either for personal gain, or for some masonic purpose. He
established a fraud mechanism which avoided any personal risk. When Mr
Quatraro’s irregularities came to light, he entrusted the internal enquiry to
a former colleague. He limited the scope of that enquiry to the activities
of Mr Quatraro, since he knew that a wider investigation – even if conducted
by a friend – would have been obliged to record that Mr Quatraro both issued
tenders and awarded contracts. The
motivation of Messrs [H]/[R] becomes explicable. As dutiful freemasons,
both would be obliged to protect their brother mason and/or obey masonic
instructions to “back off” from an in-depth investigation of the case.
Since the corrupt deals – which were international in character –
would have needed sanction at a high level within the masonic hierarchy, such
instructions to Messrs [H]/[R] would have been imperatives. As one English
mason of 35 years remarked [in Short, p186], “Freemasonry is all about due
subordination.” Loyalty to the brotherhood is the highest duty of a
freemason; the consequence of disloyalty is social and possibly financial ruin.
In normal circumstances, when either of these auditors “misses” a point
during the study of a topic, they are keen that the next study of the same topic
examines the point previously “missed”. But in respect of the
“Quatraro Case”, both have discouraged any further examination of the
subject. Both auditors would be aware that anything beyond a superficial
examination of the affair, would have raised questions as to the conduct of Mr
[X]. This would have risked exposing the masonic nature of the affair. The
motivation of UCLAF/OLAF becomes explicable. The scope of its
“investigation” of the Quatraro Case was no wider than that ordered by Mr
[X], and for the same reasons. A wider examination, the results of which
would be reported to a non-masonic readership, would have raised awkward
questions as to Mr [X]’ conduct. If the report to Mme Theato had not
omitted key facts, then the European Parliament might have asked for further
enquiry to be made into the negligence, or worse, of Mr Quatraro’s superiors.
Such further enquiry would have risked initiating an uncontrollable chain of
events which would eventually expose the masonic nature of the corrupt deals in
particular, and the influence of freemasonry within the Commission in general.
The motivation for OLAF’s reluctance to enquire into the “China” case also
becomes explicable; it may be assumed that this deal was similar in nature to
the deals agreed by Mr Quatraro. The
hypothesis then needs to explain: If the corruption enjoyed the sanction
of freemasonry, the mafia, UCLAF/OLAF, senior auditors of the Court, and Mr [X]
(at the time, and in reality if not on paper, the most powerful civil servant in
Europe, as the Director General responsible for the CAP) – how could it fail?
With such powerful participants, locked together in a strong alliance – how
could the corruption come to light? Why was there no cover-up to protect
Mr Quatraro? The
comfortable arrangement was disturbed in the classic manner typical of fraud
cases – by the unpredicted. And by the time the participants knew they
had a problem, knowledge of irregularity had already reached a sufficiently
large number of non-masonic individuals to make it too late to attempt any
cover-up to protect Mr Quattraro. |
