'Whistleblower' Robert Dougal Watt speaks out

“The committee feels that the link between Cosa Nostra and [Italian] institutions is mostly through the ‘Massoneria’  [freemasonry]…  The fundamental terrain on which the link between Cosa Nostra with public officials and private professions was created and reinforced is the Massoneria.  The Massoneria bond serves to keep the relationship continuous and organic.  The admission of members of Cosa Nostra, even at high levels, in Massoneria is not an occasional or episodical one, but a strategic choice… the Massoneria associations offer the mafia a formidable instrument to extend their own power, to obtain favours and privileges in every field; both for the conclusion of big business and “fixing trials”, as many collaborators with justice have revealed”. (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the phenomenon of mafia and other criminal associations, Report on relations between mafia and politics, p.59, Rome, 1993; quoted in Umberto Santini, “Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe against mafia and organised crime”, p13)

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Mr Michel HERVÉ
Secretary General
European Court of Auditors

Subject:  My letter of 22 April 2002

I.      Introduction

Thank you for your letter of 29 May, which I received on 11 June.  For reasons which I hope from this letter will be clear, and deemed acceptable, I have some difficulty to disclose my current precise place of residence.  I also recognise that my departure from Luxembourg represents an infringement of the rules of the institution with regard to sick leave.  Again, I hope that the reasons for this infringement will be clear, and deemed acceptable, upon the basis of the contents of this letter.  For your information I may be contacted in Scotland, care of Mr ***;  fax ***;  e-mail ***.

This letter is set out in seven parts.  Since the information provided herein is likely to be entirely unexpected, for the sake of clarity the next part will provide a summary of the main themes of the letter, each of which will be presented and discussed in detail in the main sections. 

However, I feel I should point out straight away – given the nature of the contents of this letter, and given that in my understanding you have been deliberately misled to date regarding my mental state – that neither my doctor in Luxembourg, nor my doctor in Scotland, has diagnosed me as paranoid or in any way, “mad”.  I have been prescribed beta-blockers and sleeping pills for stress, and an anti-depressant for anxiety; but both doctors have assured me that stress and anxiety are the rational responses of an individual who finds him/herself in circumstances such as mine.  This stress and anxiety arise from much more than worry about holding on to my job and pension entitlements – which I knowingly placed at risk on 22 April; but from concern over the physical well-being of my family and myself – which I did not knowingly place at risk.  I will describe these concerns in detail in this letter; since these matters are complex and highly unusual, I regret my letter is rather long.

II.     A summary of the main points presented in this letter

According to the Decision cited in the title of my letter of 22 April, I should have presented the allegations contained therein to OLAF.  I did not do so; giving as my reason, the second concern identified in my letter to Mr Karlsson of 4 December 2001.  That concern related to OLAF’s apparent failure to follow up potential evidence in respect of a case apparently still classified by the Belgian police as an unsolved murder.  Considered together with other evidence, as at 22 April I had no faith in OLAF’s willingness to thoroughly investigate allegations made against senior individuals within the institutions.  I therefore submitted my allegations to the Ombudsman.  However, bearing in my mind that the Court is corrupt – at least, in my perception, and by my definition of 22 April – and OLAF at best incompetent, I thought it unwise to assume “third time lucky” with the Ombudsman; I also sent my letter to MEPs.

However, the transmission of my letter to MEPs was – I believe – sabotaged,  via the simple expedient of an unofficial “post-room delay”.  I believe, upon the basis of evidence to be presented later in this letter, that this intervention was undertaken by freemasons.  With the benefit of hindsight, I can identify at least three possible reasons why masons should have wished to sabotage my initiative:  a) to protect brother masons in senior positions in the Court against whom I present allegations in my letter;  b) to protect the institution’s current modus operandi, which provides an environment in which freemasonry can flourish; and,  c) to address the threat to the reputation of OLAF implied by my letter of 22 April.    

The next section of my letter presents a hypothesis, which brings together and explains all of the facts known to me, regarding both the death in suspicious circumstances, and certain post-22 April events in my own case.  I should like to emphasise my letter presents a hypothesis, and not a proof.  Further investigation, as appropriate, would be necessary to confirm key aspects and obtain essential supporting evidence. 

Essentially, I conclude:  that contrary to the findings of contemporary official enquiries, the corrupt Commission head of division who died in 1993 was not a “lone fraudster”, but one element of a corrupt conspiracy within the Commission; that he was protected by a more senior corrupt official, probably Director General [X]; that Mr [X] in turn enjoyed the protection (or at least non-intervention, which in this context, amounts to the same thing) of both UCLAF/OLAF and senior Court auditors; that this conspiracy included the Italian mafia; and that all of the foregoing involved freemasonry.

Clearly, the above constitutes a deeply shocking suggestion.  It may, at first reading, seem paranoid and absurd.  However, the only truly novel aspect of my hypothesis, is to suggest that a linkage exists between certain phenomena which are already known and widely acknowledged.  Specifically, the evidence available to me, and which is presented either in my letter of 22 April, or herein, indicates that:  the Court’s procedures are vulnerable to abuse, and have been abused; OLAF protects corrupt senior individuals; freemasonry is influential within the institutions; and the mafia is involved, both in freemasonry in general, and in the specific fraud in particular.  

The hypothesis presented also constitutes a plausible explanation for many occurences which are otherwise – in my opinion – inexplicable.  Since to me the hypothesis is credible, I consequently have some concern for my physical well-being.  I present this hypothesis to you, as the Secretary General of the Court of Auditors:  a) because I consider it my duty as a Court official to do so, regardless of how I am currently perceived by the institution; and  b) because I do not wish to be dead. 

III.    Explanation for unorthodox method of communicating allegations

According to the Decision cited in the title of my letter of 22 April, I should have presented the allegations contained therein to OLAF.  Instead, I presented my complaint to the Ombudsman, and copied it to c.500 MEP’s (i.e., to all members of the Budgetary Control Committee, UK MEP’s, and all MEP’s of surnames c.G-Z).  I also promised in my letter to the Ombudsman to provide further explanation, in due course, for my failure to follow normal procedure; a promise to date unfulfilled, due to my extended sick leave.

During the period 1999-2001, I constituted the junior half of a small audit team working full-time on fieldwork for a draft Special Report on the sound financial management of the Common Organisation of the Market (COM) in raw tobacco.  The relevant documentation featured references to a series of events in 1991-93, known collectively as the “Quatraro Case”.  The affair constituted a major scandal with high political and press interest, reported on in Court Special Report 8/93, and led directly to the formation by the Commission of the internal enquiry body, UCLAF.

The “official” version of the case, as communicated to Mme Theato, Chair of the Budgetary Control Committee of the European Parliament, can be briefly summarised.  Mr Quatraro, Head of the Commission division responsible for management of the tobacco market, came under suspicion of having committed irregularities in the handling of sales of intervention tobacco from public storage.  Some of the irregular transactions took place with companies allegedly linked to the mafia.  Pending the outcome of a detailed investigation, Mr Quatraro was allocated to another post within DG-Agriculture.  In the midst of this investigation, Mr Quatraro fell from a window of the Commission building in Rue de la Loi, Brussels, to his death on a pedestrian escalator in the street below.  This event brought the enquiry to an end.  The European Parliament was so concerned by the case that it secured the creation of UCLAF, to follow up any future cases of suspected internal corruption.  This unit in due course has become the agency, OLAF. 

In 2001, the “tobacco audit” team on mission in Greece, received during audit interview a series of detailed allegations of fraud and corruption involving Community funds, presented by two related auditees.  The auditees claimed to possess supporting documentary evidence.  One minor allegation related to the accepted version of the “Quatraro Case”; which in one minor respect was alleged to be unsound. 

In accordance with the formal agreement between the Court and OLAF on the handling of such allegations, the auditors neither followed up these claims on-the-spot, nor examined the documentary evidence cited; but merely recorded the allegations presented, and the individuals’ details, and forwarded these to OLAF for follow-up, as the competent Community body for handling such matters.  Also as per the formal procedure, some weeks later OLAF provided a formal response to the Court.  Normally, such communications set out the follow-up work done by OLAF.  However in this case, OLAF’s response provided no evidence of any follow-up having been made of any of the alleged abuses.  The OLAF response covered only the “Quatraro Case”, providing an update on the legal procedures in Italy and Greece consequent upon Mr Quatraro’s corruption.  The OLAF response did not evidence that the agency had contacted the individuals who had presented serious allegations of Member State failure to apply Community law.  I endeavoured, on two occasions, to obtain a request from the Court to OLAF for further information to be provided on the follow-up made of the allegations forwarded.  My hierarchy rejected these proposals.  OLAF’s perception of the “Quatraro Case”, as described in the 2001 letter, showed no material change from the version communicated to Parliament some years ago.

As I worked on the tobacco audit I gradually acquired a greater knowledge of the “Quatraro Case” from those auditors who had worked on the Court’s previous study of the tobacco COM, made in 1992-93, and who had been investigating the apparent irregularities at the time of Mr Quatraro’s death.  My interest reflected a wish to familiarise myself with the immediate background to the topic we were auditing, i.e., the COM reform of 1996-98.  However, the more I learned of the case, the more puzzled and intrigued I became. 

The closure of the internal investigation into alleged malpractice upon the death of Mr Quatraro indicates that the Commission hierarchy believed that Mr Quatraro acted alone within the institution; “one bad apple”.  However, the “official” version of events omits a number of elements. 

Firstly, although following his death much was made by the press of his wealthy lifestyle, and that he lived in a substantial villa in a fashionable area of Brussels; in fact Mr Quatraro enjoyed a substantial private wealth, independent of his income as a Commission official.  Mr Quatraro was already wealthy through marriage, prior to his appointment to the Commission’s tobacco division. 

Secondly, although the value of the transactions which he authorised was substantial, it is not clear whether he received any correspondingly significant  “improper” payments.  Often fraudsters’ unusual income is matched by unusual expenditure; e.g., heavy gambling – but I understand that the only “unusual” outgoings of Mr Quatraro which were subsequently identified by investigators, were donations made to a political party in his state of origin, Italy.  Normally, it is possible for a fraud investigation to identify either “greed” or “need”.  In Mr Quatraro’s case, neither of these is evident.

Thirdly, by the early 1990’s, Mr Quatraro had long experience of the tobacco sector.  An internal Philip Morris memorandum written in 1985, recording one executive’s assessment of Mr Quatraro’s knowledge of the local tobacco market during an official visit to Spain, observed, “he appeared remarkably well informed on the country” (Mr Vanharn to Mr Hansen, 21.8.85).  With his extensive knowledge of the sector, Mr Quatraro would have been aware that certain tobacco processing companies in his state of origin were linked to the mafia.  Certainly, press reports following his death linked such companies to the mafia.  So he would have known that if he wanted to engage in fraud, then he would risk involving himself with the most infamous organised criminals in Europe.      

Fourthly, although it is clearly implied by the “official version” that Mr Quatraro’s death was a suicide, and this cause was widely reported in the press at the time; it does not appear to be certain.  As I understand it, the forensic evidence was not decisive, and Belgian police classified the case as an unsolved murder. 

Mr Quatraro’s case is therefore fundamentally odd, if considered as an incident involving a lone fraudster.  If the “official version” is to be believed:  an experienced and knowledgable official did something for no apparent reason; for no obvious significant gain; with the most high-risk associates he could have chosen; and died in mysterious circumstances.  It might therefore be concluded, that the investigation into this case should have given consideration to the possibility that Mr Quatraro did not act alone within the Commission.   

The initial investigation (i.e., the enquiry which was later followed up by UCLAF/OLAF, who then presented what I have termed the “official version” to Mme Theato) was ordered by Mr Quatraro’s own superior, Director General [X].  The remit of this enquiry was explicitly limited to examining the Head of Division’s actions in carrying out his duties.  It did not examine how Mr Quatraro’s managers had carried out their duties; e.g., verify the adequacy of the hierarchy’s supervision or control of Mr Quatraro.  This investigation was conducted by a retired former colleague of the Director General, a Mr Wachter.

The potential for fraud in the tendering/contract award procedure for sales of intervention tobacco arose due to an inadequate separation of duties at senior level.  Essentially, all the key functions were performed by the Head of Division.  In the cases of sales of other intervention agricultural products, functions were separated – with final authorisation of sales given at higher hierarchical levels, ultimately Director General.  In the case of tobacco, Mr Quatraro apparently persuaded his superiors that the tobacco market was so complex, that only he could be entrusted to run the whole operation.  This is a strange logic for an internal control system.  Normally, the greater the complexity, the higher the risk of error and abuse; and consequently, the greater is the sophistication of the internal controls adopted to prevent or detect irregularity.  Mr [X] was a very experienced Director General.  Yet in this case, the reverse took place; due to high complexity, internal controls were weakened, rather than strengthened. 

According to the allegation provided to the Court’s auditors in 2001, shortly prior to Mr Quatraro’s suspension, representatives of most companies in the European tobacco processing industry had met in the Europa Hotel, Brussels; by this account, Mr Quatraro’s corruption was not known to the industry at this time.  The companies allegedly decided that since Mr Quatraro’s general handling of tobacco COM rules was so contrary to their commercial interests, they would endeavour to secure his transfer to another Commission division.  From audit work on the documentation supporting COM(96)554, the Commission report which led to COM reform, it is clear that the institution paid close attention to industry wishes:  during the same period of reform preparation when tobacco growers’ representatives were writing to Mr Fischler to complain about the Commission’s suspension of consultative joint committees, senior tobacco processing company and cigarette company executives were writing to senior officials expressing gratitude for their presence at hospitality events. 

In short, all the facts excluded from the subsequent OLAF/UCLAF case review which was presented to Mme Theato, are those which – if they had been provided – might have suggested to the European Parliament that Mr Quatraro did not act alone.   The only facts included in the “official version”, are those which lead the reader to the conclusion that Mr Quatraro was one “bad apple” acting alone.

As at 22 April, therefore, considerable doubt existed in my mind as to the willingness and/or ability of OLAF to follow up evidence and/or allegations against highly-placed individuals in the Community institutions.  This unfavourable perception had been reinforced by my knowledge of OLAF’s handling of a number of further cases.

On the occasion of a routine fact-finding mission to OLAF in Spring 2001, my team leader recounted to me the treatment of a case he had been involved in presenting to OLAF a couple of years’ previously.  This evidence related to the handling of sales of agricultural produce to China; via a Swiss-registered company acting as intermediary, SGS.  (This company is ‘known’ to the Court’s “export refund” unit.  Coincidentally, SGS also has important contracts for the administration of FEOGA expenditure in Italy.)  The evidence in the “China” case indicated the possibility of a financial irregularity having been committed by Director General [X].  As per the official procedure governing Court/OLAF relations, this evidence was presented to OLAF, for further pursuit.  However, OLAF’s response, after some lively discussion, was along the lines of:  “Unless you can show me the official’s bank statement recording a payment from these people, we’re not doing anything”.  Obtaining bank records in such cases is of course a matter within the competence of OLAF, and not of the Court; no follow-up action was taken.

Two much less significant incidents, which I include for completeness, are identified below.

In August 2001, as part of my work on the tobacco audit, I identified evidence of serious breaches of confidentiality by named officials of the Commission, in the period 1980-90.  In late 2001, the Court communicated to OLAF such evidence of wide and deep penetration of Commission services by multinational cigarette companies.  Documentation of such penetration is in the public domain (see in particular the reports to Philip Morris executives of their European Affairs Consultant, at www.pmdocs.com; for search, enter “Author: HEYNIG”).  Official documents on the internet include Commission papers marked “confidential” and “for official use only”; correspondence between a Commissioner and a Norwegian minister; another letter bearing a “Cabinet received” stamp; and a record of the Commission Legal Service’s misgivings over the strength of the institution’s legal basis for introducing anti-smoking legislation.  So intimate was the cigarette companies’ knowledge of Commission internal affairs, they even knew a directive had “erroneously” been signed into law, because an attache had placed a dossier in the wrong pile on a Commissioner’s desk.  The documentation provided to OLAF identified specific senior Commission officials as the sources of such confidential information.  As the named originator of the Court’s submission, in the event of any follow-up interest by OLAF, I might have expected to be requested to provide further information.  I received no such request; so far as I am aware, OLAF has expressed no subsequent interest in this dossier.  Although evidence of irregularity in the internet archive ceases with effect from 1990, it is inherently unlikely that cigarette company interest in Commission activities actually ceased; it is much more likely that such interest is simply not recorded in the archive.  OLAF’s lack of interest in pursuing this issue is surprising, since given the Commission’s on-going legal proceedings in the United States against multinational cigarette companies, it would clearly be in the companies’ interest to have current knowledge of the Commission Legal Service’s perception of the strength of the institution’s case.

I understand that several months ago, an allegation was presented to OLAF regarding the conduct in office of a Member of the Court who has since retired.  The Member had allegedly secured employment contracts for prospective/existing temporary staff in return for financial reward from those receiving such contracts.  It might reasonably be expected that any thorough investigation of such an allegation would involve questioning those appointed in consequence of this Member’s lobbying of the Court Administration, in order to gather available evidence of any improper activity which might have taken place, or been suggested.  The potential number of beneficiaries from any improper activity – if it in fact took place – is limited to no more than a single digit number.  One of the first individuals to receive a renewed temporary contract from the Court’s Administration, at the personal request of the Member identified, has not been asked to confirm the propriety of a contract extension which he received, nor asked to confirm that no financial gain was provided to the Member in return.  As an “A” grade appointment, for twelve months, this contract was worth a substantial amount to the individual concerned.  (In fact, I can confirm that no impropriety occurred in this case; the extension to the contract related to a requirement to carry out a specific audit task.  I can personally affirm the reliability of the above, since the individual in question - is me.)

I should like to emphasise that the cases discussed above do not constitute a “cherry-picked” sample, selected by me to show OLAF in a bad light.  In fact, they represent the totality of my knowledge of OLAF’s work.  In every case in my knowledge involving potential wrong-doing by senior individuals within the institutions, OLAF has failed to pursue leads in the manner which might be expected.  Accordingly, in placing my career at risk on 22 April, I considered it unwise to place any reliance on OLAF’s ability or willingness to pursue in a professional and impartial manner my allegations against the Court. 

I also note that the above observations are entirely consistent with the findings of Mr Paul Van Buitenen, who – prior to communicating his concerns to the European Parliament – initially endeavoured to interest UCLAF in the evidence he possessed of high-level wrong-doing.  In his book, “Blowing the Whistle” (Politico’s Publishing, 2000), Mr Van Buitenen records a series of instances in which he presented allegations backed by evidence to UCLAF, but subsequently heard nothing.  At pages 56-7:  “I contacted Bianchi [Van Buitenen’s contact at UCLAF] again.  He made it clear to me that my information was not concrete enough for them to start an official investigation.  I was puzzled.  How concrete did it have to be?  Bianchi told me that hard and exhaustive evidence was needed before such high-ranking officials could be investigated.  ‘But isn’t an UCLAF investigation supposed to collect the hard evidence?’, I burst out… Evidently the fraud prevention unit couldn’t decide for itself when an investigation was necessary… I felt let down… apparently I had to provide all the evidence cut and dried.  That was not my job…”.  Another of Van Buitenen’s colleagues provided UCLAF with a copy of a damning internal audit report;  “However there was no response from UCLAF.  They continued to maintain that they did not have enough proof to start an investigation” [p65-6].  “Evidently DG-XXII, DG-XX and UCLAF wanted to keep the dirty washing hidden for as long as possible – and certainly not bother the people at the top with it.  The European Parliament had been consistently kept in the dark” [p79-80].  “I reported the irregularities but UCLAF was unwilling to investigate further” [p121].  “The way the fraud prevention unit worked left a lot to be desired” [p122].  “Two other DG-XXII officials had already been to UCLAF earlier that year… I was told by another colleague, Rene Lejeffe, that he had approached UCLAF several times about irregularities in DG-XXII and he complained to me that they were not prepared to take any action” [p53]. 

Mr Van Buitenen in recent months has presented a fresh set of allegations of high-level wrong-doing to OLAF.  Reportedly, he identified 270 cases of suspected irregularity, supported by evidence.  OLAF has recently announced that it will pursue just 4 of these cases; all of which relate to suspected irregularities committed some years ago, during the already-discredited Santer Presidency of the Commission.

I also considered it unwise to place full reliance on the Ombudsman.  Relative to the depth of my knowledge of OLAF, my knowledge of the Ombudsman on 22 April was limited to just one incident; but that was entirely negative. 

At some time during the period 1998-2000 (I regret I do not have access to documentation allowing me to be more specific), in response to an initiative of the Ombudsman, our institution prepared a “Code of Conduct”, to be applicable to all staff and Members.  The Court delegated preparation of a draft Code, initially to ADAR (technical audit support) and latterly to the Administration:  on both occasions substantial draft texts, based on the international auditing standards to which the Court publicly adheres, were submitted for consideration.  But both drafts were rejected by the Court; which settled for its own formulation, so brief and vapid as to be worthless for any practical purpose.  Yet this self-evidently empty document was – at least implicitly – accepted by the Ombudsman.  I deduced from this that the Ombudsman was more interested in form than in substance, and in being seen to be active rather than in being effective. 

Therefore:  given my knowledge of Court corruption; of OLAF inadequacy; and my misgivings with regard to the efficacy of the Ombudsman; I concluded that if the serious allegations contained in my letter were to be assured an opportunity of thorough investigation, then I should also copy it to MEP’s.           

IV.    Events subsequent to the sending of my letter of 22 April 2002

On the morning of 22 April, I delivered my letter plus an attached annex to the Ombudsman, along with c.20 copies of my letter addressed to individual MEP’s (mainly members of the Budgetary Control Committee), to the European Parliament’s internal mail unit, located in the Konrad Adenauer Building, Luxembourg.  I then returned to the Court’s building, and sent a copy of the letter to all staff via e-mail.  I left the building, and went to see my doctor, who signed me off work for one week.  On the morning of 23 April in Brussels, en route to Scotland, I delivered a further c.480 letters to MEP’s to the Parliament’s internal mail unit off Rue Wiertz. 

Given the nature of the content of these letters and their wide distribution, I anticipated a fairly swift and significant public reaction.  Suffering from stress, I went off to Scotland to stay with my family, since I live alone in Luxembourg.  (At that time, I regret I was unaware of the rule which prohibits an official on sick leave from leaving the country of normal residence.)

When no reaction had arisen by the morning of Wednesday, 24 April, I concluded that it was possible my letters had been deliberately with-held from MEP’s.  Since interference with MEPs’ mail would be improper, I concluded that any such action must be unofficial in nature.  In my knowledge, the only unofficial group which could have done the deed – i.e., which possessed the required staff numbers, influence, co-ordination, rapidity of response, and lack of accountability – was the freemasons. 

Freemasonry is powerful within the European institutions.  Within a few weeks of arriving in the Court in 1995, I was informed from numerous sources that a significant number of staff, in particular those at a senior level, were freemasons.  Two close colleagues informed me they had been invited to join, soon after arriving in Luxembourg – they had declined.  Freemasonry is reportedly powerful in the British civil service; however, in my six years in the UK civil service, I never encountered any indication of freemasonry.  I conclude from this that freemasonry is an even more powerful presence in the European civil service.  I was told that each nationality is organised in a separate lodge, and feature members from, inter alia, all the European institutions in Luxembourg – the secretariat of the European Parliament, the Commission, Court of Justice, European Investment Bank, etc., as well as the Court of Auditors.

Mr Van Buitenen has also made reference to masonic influence in the Commission.  For example:  “Senior staff with sufficient political protection are often not subject to appropriate disciplinary procedures or are freed of any further suspicion.  Sometimes, astonishing details about the proceedings in the disciplinary investigations as well as the administrative enquiries come to the surface.  One example is that of an official who, at a certain point during an interrogation, refused to continue speaking without first consulting his Godfather (‘Parrain’).  Further informal enquiries made by me, seemed to confirm the existence of a Masonic lodge of which this official, as well as several other very senior staff, appeared to be a member”  (“Blowing the Whistle”, p251-2). 

I concluded that if the freemasons had intercepted my letter, it could only be because I had offended their interests.  This caused me great concern.  Since the freemasons are unaccountable, I feared that even if I were officially vindicated in my exposure of corruption in the Court, unofficial sanctions might yet be applied.  I became very anxious because of this. 

I re-read my letter in order to try to identify the cause of any masonic offence.  I could find none in my criticism of the Court; in my experience, masons and non-masons alike express concern over the situation in the institution.  Then I concluded, to my horror, that if the freemasons had seized my letter – it might be because they wished to prevent information coming to light about OLAF’s failure to follow up a suspected murder case with links to the Italian mafia.  I wondered why this should concern the masons. 

And then, “the penny dropped”.  All that which had puzzled and intrigued me about the “Quatraro Case”, for so long turning over in the back of my mind, became readily explicable – if one assumed the existence of a masonic dimension to that case (a thesis discussed in detail in the following section of this letter).  I started to worry about a great deal more than my pension entitlements.  I entered a state of shock, from which I have yet to emerge.  It has taken me several weeks to write this letter, to present my thoughts in an even reasonably coherent manner; the implications of my hypothesis on the “Quatraro Case” are so deeply disturbing. 

On 22 April, it was my intention to raise awareness of corruption within my institution.  It was not my intention to launch a one-man crusade against freemasonry.  The idea never entered my head.  Therefore on 25 April, in order to address the possibility of masonic involvement, I telephoned my friend, and the one individual in the Court whom I know with certainty to be a freemason, since some months ago he invited me to consider applying; Mr [R]. 

After normal preliminaries, I informed Mr [R] that my action had not been intended to transgress any interests of the freemasons.  Mr [R] responded that freemasons are law-abiding and do good work.  I replied that I could see the possibility of a masonic dimension in the “Quatraro Case”; and that I had no desire to rake up that case, since I did not want to undermine my position or well-being.  Mr [R] told me he had no idea what I was talking about, and advised me to seek counselling.  During the course of this conversation, Mr [R] asked me where I was, and I told him I was telephoning from Scotland.

The next day, I telephoned the Ombudsman’s office.  I was informed that my letter to him, delivered in Luxembourg on 22 April, had arrived in Strasbourg on 25 April.  I was temporarily relieved that not all my letters had been “disappeared”.

On Saturday, 27 April, en route to Luxembourg to see my doctor again, I received a telephone message from Mr [R], recorded on 26 April, indicating that he wished to talk with me urgently.  We arranged to meet at his home.  On Sunday, 28 April, we met and conversed for around an hour, without witnesses.

Mr [R] informed me that immediately following our telephone conversation on 25 April, he had contacted your office.  He added that you had then interrupted your participation in a Court meeting, in order to discuss his conversation with me.  Mr [R] stated that the next day, you had been persuaded to invite OLAF to investigate the allegations presented in my letter.  Mr [R] expressed his approval of this initiative.  He also told me that he had written a note to you, recording his conversation with me.  According to his note, I had stated I was in Scotland; and I had expressed concern about being persecuted by, “dark forces”.  This term implies belief in persecution by supernatural or satanic powers, active in the physical world.  In fact – as Mr [R] well understood at the time of our telephone conversation – I spoke about the possibility that I, or my family, might be victimised in some way by freemasons, in response to my initiative of 22 April.   

Mr [R] asked me, “How did you know the letters hadn’t been delivered?”.  The auditor in me carefully noted this phrasing; the question was not, “What makes you think the letters haven’t been delivered?”.  I replied that if they had been, I would have expected some sort of public reaction, given the contents; and it seemed to me remarkable, that although the Ombudsman had confirmed receipt of my letter in Strasbourg on 25 April (i.e., 3 days after delivery in Luxembourg), in the same delay my letters to MEPs had not moved from the basement of the Brussels Parliament building to the MEPs’ offices upstairs.  Mr [R] smiled, and informed me of a conversation he had held with you, shortly after my e-mail of 22 April.  Mr [R]’s account of that conversation ran as follows:

[R]:  You know, I think it would be best if those letters weren’t delivered to MEPs.
Hervé:  Yes, but there’s nothing I can do.  I can’t interfere with the Parliament’s administration. 
[R]:  Well, I still think it would be best if those letters weren’t delivered.

I understood from the above that Mr [R], via masonic contacts in the European Parliament’s administration, had secured the non-delivery of my letters to MEPs.  (I know two freemasons in the Parliament’s Luxembourg secretariat:  […].)  I also understood that Mr [R] wanted me to know that he had secured the non-delivery of my letters to MEPs. 

Most chillingly, I also deduced from my conversation with Mr [R] that the timely delivery of my letter to the Ombudsman had been freely permitted.  I consequently deduced from this that the Ombudsman represents for the freemasons a “safe pair of hands” to deal with my allegations.

Mr [R] then advised me to come to work on Monday, 29 April, in order to: a) plead I had been insane on 22 April; and b) to deliver a short note, for the attention of the Parliament’s administration, requesting the withdrawal of my letters to MEPs of the previous week. 

By 28 April, it might be reasonably assumed that my letters had already been delivered – except by someone who knew the letters had actually been intercepted.  And the “short note” was to be addressed to the EP administration; i.e., the purpose of the note was to cover the risk for Parliament staff of an MEP asking Parliament officials at any later date why s/he had not received my letter.    

Mr [R] also emphasised that I should give this note to you on the morning of 29 April.  The significance of this timing did not strike me until later; the Staff Committee election results were scheduled to be announced at noon on 29 April.

I believe if I had followed Mr [R]’s advice, and presented a plea of insanity along with a retraction on the morning of 29 April, then my letters to MEPs would never have been delivered.  Even if a copy of my letter did subsequently reach public attention (e.g., via a “leak” by one of my colleagues of the e-mail version of my letter), it would have been discredited by an “admission” of insanity and a note of retraction. 

However, beyond the deadline of 29 April, it would have become difficult for Parliament staff to convincingly attribute the non-delivery of my letters to any routine “mail-room delay”.  And it was predictable that the likelihood of a retraction would diminish, when I became aware of the strength of support from colleagues.  My letters to MEPs were delivered on 29 April.

The point which convinces me that Mr [R] acted contrary to my best interests, lies in his written communication to you that I was in Scotland.  Until that time, the Court’s Administration had no firm information on my precise location, other than that I was absent on sick leave.  I understand that a visit was made to my home; but I might have simply been out to the pharmacist.  It was from Mr [R] that I became aware of the rule which prohibits an official from leaving his country of residence during sick leave without the permission of his institution.  I realised during our conversation that the submission of a written note by Mr [R], recording my location, permitted a procedure to be initiated against me for failing to obtain written permission for leaving Luxembourg.  At the same time as covertly sabotaging my initiative, Mr [R] presented himself as my friend, offering to represent me in disciplinary proceedings.  This experience was deeply disorienting.  As Mr Schmitt can attest, by the next day, 29 April, I was extremely distressed; and sufficiently frightened to be willing to sign a note of retraction.  However, I was too upset to write such a note.  Within five minutes of telephoning Mr Schmitt, I was on a train to Brussels en route to Scotland.    

I believe the holding of my letters until 29 April also served a further purpose.  For the week 22-26 April, MEPs were in session in Brussels.  But they then left for a ‘constituency week’, 29 April-3 May; most of my letters therefore arrived in empty offices.

In that week, a “media spin” took place which minimised the impact of my letter.  There is no evidence of any “supporter” of mine talking to the press, at any time; and there would have been no purpose in any “supporter” of mine leaking my letter to the press, since staff assumed my letter had already reached MEPs.  Both the “European Voice” and “The Sunday Times” sensationalised my allegations, by focussing almost exclusively on the claims of sexual harrassment and nepotism, and the institution’s denials of both.  Neither publication recorded the detailed allegations of serious mismanagement. 

Post-22 April developments suggest that my original assessments of both OLAF and the Ombudsman were sound.  OLAF has informed me that its investigators would even be prepared to visit me in Scotland.  On the basis of my knowledge of OLAF’s work, and given my implicit criticism of the agency in my letter of 22 April, I conclude that OLAF’s primary intent is to improperly discredit my allegations. 

The Ombudsman’s treatment of my complaint is certainly consistent with my initial assessment.  As noted in my letter of 22 April, my original intention was to identify further supporting evidence in private to the Ombudsman.  I wished to avoid causing public embarrassment to individuals and Community organisations. 

When I telephoned the Office of the Ombudsman to confirm his receipt of my complaint, I was informed – by Mr Harden, the official dealing with the case – that the Ombudsman’s procedure is to invite a preliminary response from the institution which is the subject of allegations; and then to invite the individual who submitted the allegations to provide supporting evidence, and/or comment on the preliminary response of the institution.  However, in my case, this has not happened.  Instead, the Ombudsman has decided to reject out of hand all aspects of my complaint; even though certain of my allegations at least were detailed and specific. 

Furthermore, contrary to the indication given in the Ombudsman’s letter, I did not waive “confidentiality” in respect of the supporting dossier to my complaint.  I am appalled by this suggestion, which I consider to be absurd.  This whole affair began because I sought to protect the confidentiality of the undercover operation, from the improper decision of Mr [S]. 

However, in conclusion, I should like to emphasise that I consider the issue of the “mail-room delay”, in and of itself, to be of minor significance.  It delayed my letters; gave me cause for alarm; and reduced the initial impact of my allegations.  But fundamentally, it has altered nothing.  I believe the real significance of this incident, lies in the context of the hypothesis to be presented in the following section. That is:  for those non-masons who already believe, or suspect, that the late delivery of my letters was not “accidental”; the credibility of the following hypothesis will be significantly raised.     

V.     Hypothesis:  the “Quatraro Case”, and more recent events

I wish to emphasise that this section of my letter constitutes a hypothesis.  The evidence presented does not constitute a proof.  The hypothesis does, however, explain the known facts; and it is the only explanation I can identify which does account for all those facts.  As I perceive it, the hypothesis has value as a guide to further investigative work; it should not be interpreted as a substitute for that investigative work. 

The hypothesis:   The “Quatraro Case” in particular, the attitude of OLAF to high-level wrong-doing in general, and the post-22 April events in my own case discussed above, may best be interpreted as reflecting the manifestation of improper influence by freemasons within and between the European Institutions and with third parties (in the “Quatraro Case”, the mafia).  The aim of masonic influence is not only to protect and promote individual freemasons and those non-masons useful to freemasonry, but to preserve the current modus operandi of the institutions.  This modus operandi is characterised primarily by a lack of transparency and a lack of accountability, which provide an excellent environment in which freemasonry itself may flourish, and thereby give aid and support to freemasonry in the wider society. 

The presentation of this hypothesis requires a detailed examination of the “Quatraro Case”.

Although the Court of Auditors has claimed the credit for unearthing the alleged fraud in the Commission tobacco division, this claim is unfounded.  The credit belongs to a Commission Clearance of Accounts inspector, Mr [O], who on mission in Italy found a letter purporting to bear his signature, which he realised  had been forged by Mr Quatraro.  The inspector subsequently raised the matter in Brussels; it was this action which set in motion a train of events resulting in the suspension of Mr Quatraro from his post in the tobacco division.

When the matter was brought to his attention, DirectornGeneral [X] ordered an enquiry.  This was undertaken by a former personal colleague of his; and its the remit was explicitly limited to Mr Quatraro’s activities.  The consequent enquiry report has never been released by the Commission.  The Court’s review in 1992-93 of the Commission’s initial investigation was led by two officials well known within our institution to be freemasons:  Mr [H], Head of Division (now Director), and Mr [R], Principal Auditor (now Head of Division).

Mr [R] was permitted by the Commission to read the enquiry report, in a sealed room, but he was not permitted to make photocopies.  In 2000, I repeatedly endeavoured to persuade my hierarchy that the Court should formally request a copy of the report; without success. 

The reasons given to me as to why the Court did not follow up in 1992-93 the possibility that Mr Quatraro did not act alone, are that there is nothing in the enquiry report of any interest (Mr [R]), and that Mr Quatraro’s family has already suffered enough (Mr [H]).  The Quatraro family are certainly tragic figures in this very sad affair.  Subsequent to Mr Quatraro’s death, his son committed suicide.

Nevertheless, I find the lack of Court follow-up in 1992-93, and the reasons given, to be strange.  Both Mr [H] and Mr [R] are highly vigorous, competent and respected auditors within the Court.  Yet the risk that Mr Quatraro did not act alone is clear.  All the facts excluded from the “official version” are those which – if they had been provided – would have suggested that Mr Quatraro did not act alone.  The only facts included in the “official version”, are those which imply Mr Quatraro acted alone.  A finding that Mr Quatraro may not have been the principal, and was perhaps even coerced into his role, might be expected to lessen the suffering of his family.   

For the reasons identified earlier, it is inherently unlikely that the Head of Division was the principal behind the alleged fraud.  In this context, I consider it inexplicable that questions were not put to the senior official who had authorised a unique internal control procedure for sales of intervention tobacco held in storage.  The procedure authorised by Director General [X] effectively “took him out of the loop”.  In fact, if not in intent, this secured him deniability for any subsequent wrong-doing by the Head of Division.

The apparently “untouchable” status of Director General [X] is confirmed by the case concerning sales to China.  In this case, Mr [H] supported by my future Team Leader, argued vigorously with OLAF over the need for a detailed investigation of the case.  At first consideration, the vigour of Mr [H]’s pursuit of this case seems inconsistent with the earlier suggestion that he had “backed off” from investigating Mr [X]’ potential involvement in the “Quatraro Case”.  However, the auditor who had identified possible impropriety in this case, and who had gathered a dossier of evidence to support his conclusions, was not Mr [H], but my Team Leader.  The latter is an extremely dogged investigator; and when confronted by hierarchical rejection of his work on unsound grounds, has repeatedly shown himself prepared to take matters to higher authorities.  Mr [H] could not have simply ignored my Team Leader’s evidence; he had to be seen to act upon them. 

The normal procedure for communicating such evidence to OLAF is via formal written submission.  However, this would have established an internal record of my Team Leader’s findings; would have brought these findings to the attention of the Court’s senior hierarchy; and would have required OLAF to present a formal written response, detailing follow-up work done and/or written reasons as to why the agency did not consider the findings worthy of formal investigation.

My Team Leader’s findings were not sent in writing to OLAF.  Mr [H] chose instead to visit OLAF in Brussels, accompanied by my Team Leader, in order to communicate the findings orally.  The liveliness of the exchange of views at that meeting is irrelevant.  The key point is the outcome of this meeting; which was that neither the Court nor OLAF took any further action in following up the evidence of Mr [X]’ culpability identified by my Team Leader.

Unusually, the dossier of evidence itself was not returned to my Team Leader.  Instead, it has remained in the personal possession of Mr [H], who has kept it – unique among former case files –  throughout his subsequent internal transfers from Head of Division FEOGA2, to Director-FEOGA, Director-ADAR, and currently again Director-FEOGA.

So the question arises:  What prevented Mr [H] and Mr [R], and later UCLAF/OLAF, from following up the evident risk of Mr [X]’ involvement in irregularity? 

As noted in my letter of 22 April in the context of Mrs Cresson’s dentist, audit enquiries into the activities of senior individuals are not always authorised by the Court, even where allegations surface of a serious nature.  However, in the “Quatraro Case”, the auditors had already received full authorisation from the Court to examine the Commission’s handling of the tobacco COM; approval had been given to audit the COM well before allegations of impropriety were presented by Mr [O].  The responsible Member for the 1993 report was Mr Androutsopoulos, who apparently took little interest in this work. (Reportedly, he only commented on the draft report at the Group reading stage, when he astonished other Members by stating, “I don’t agree with my division’s report”; to which other Members, impressed by its quality, replied, “Too bad, you presented it”.) The auditors therefore had had full opportunity to examine Mr [X]’ actions in detail; if they had wished.  There is no evidence of either official being requested by the Court hierarchy to “go easy” on a high-ranking Commission official.  The same considerations apply to UCLAF/OLAF; even if allegations against high-ranking individuals are seldom acted upon, a case involving the death of a senior official which attracted press coverage would need by the Commission itself to be seen to be thoroughly investigated – and the Parliament was keenly interested in the case. 

The lack of follow-up must be attributed to either accident (i.e., incompetence) or design (i.e., deliberate decision not to investigate).  Given the high reputation of both Mr [H] and Mr [R] in the Court, and the fact that UCLAF/OLAF has had ten years to investigate the most important case in its history, it must be concluded that both Messrs [H] and [R] and UCLAF/OLAF have taken conscious decisions not to investigate the role of Mr [X]. 

Since the non-investigation of Mr [X] makes no sense in the context of the known facts of the case, it follows that we must look further in order to identify the motivation of both Mr [H]/Mr [R] and UCLAF/OLAF.

With regard to Mr [H]/Mr [R], the only fact external to the “Quatraro Case” in my knowledge, which could theoretically be sufficiently important to cause such a non-investigation, is their freemasonry.  The first working assumption of the hypothesis, therefore, is that the motive underlying the failure of the Court’s auditors to investigate Mr [X], was masonic; i.e., Mr [X] was a brother freemason.

Stephen Knight’s, “The Brotherhood” – a popular work published in 1983, but highly influential, and the most authoritative source I have been able to identify in my current circumstances – observes, “Freemasonry remains a power to be reckoned with in many European countries, France and Germany in particular.  The French Grand Master today is Air Force General Jacques Mitterand, the President’s brother, and freemasonry’s influence in politics is profound.  Francois Mitterand owes much of his success in the 1981 election to influential freemasons… According to Fred Zeller, Grand Master of the Grand Orient of France in 1971 and 1973, the 1974 presidential election would have been won by the Socialists had Valery Giscard d’Estaing not become a freemason and colluded with sympathetic forces in the Brotherhood, which eventually persuaded French freemasons that it was in their best interests to vote for Giscard.  He was initiated into the Franklin Roosevelt Lodge in Paris the year of the election” [p32-33].  Other sources corroborate the importance of freemasonry in the higher echelons of French public service.

Given this context, it is reasonable to hypothesise that France would have desired to see a freemason as the most senior French official in Brussels.

In order to maintain the hypothesis with regard to UCLAF/OLAF, it becomes necessary to identify a corresponding cause for the agency’s non-investigation of Mr [X].  This may be deduced from three events.

In March 2002, Mr [R] informed me that the widely-discussed story in the Court that a Member was under investigation by OLAF for “selling jobs”, was false.  Mr [R] stated that in fact, OLAF had received no complaint.  He asserted that the origin of the rumour was an article in a low-circulation German magazine.  The article had reached the attention of the Court; but since the German national media had failed to pick up on the story, it was unlikely that any more would be heard about it.  I responded rather abruptly that several of my sources indicated OLAF had received a complaint.  Unusually, Mr [R] did not dispute the point, but changed the subject. 

I believe the story which Mr [R] told me is fictitious; and that the purpose of this fiction, was to “launder” the reputation of OLAF in this affair.  By taking OLAF out of the story, OLAF ceases to be responsible for failing to find concrete evidence of the Member’s alleged corruption.  Thus, I reach the conclusion that Mr [R] seeks by improper means to protect OLAF.  [It has since been confirmed to me by a third party source that OLAF did indeed receive a very detailed and evidenced complaint in early 2002, via the European Parliament.  R D Watt]

Furthermore, I believe post-22 April events reinforce the credibility of a freemason/OLAF link.  From Mr [R]’s account, the Court had to be persuaded to invite OLAF to investigate my allegations within the institution.  Given that to the best of my knowledge my allegations are sound and might be endorsed as such by an impartial investigation, such reluctance is understandable.  The invitation to OLAF only makes sense, if the Court received prior assurances as to OLAF’s normal method of investigating allegations made against highly-placed individuals. 

Thirdly, the actions of Mr [H] suggest that his links with OLAF are close.  My 280-page submission to the Ombudsman records in its early pages my endeavours to secure the transmission to OLAF of evidence of cigarette company penetration of Commission services.  My FEOGA hierarchy did not agree.  Mr [H] – then Director-ADAR, and responsible for Court-OLAF relations – arranged for me to meet with Mr Bruner, the Director-OLAF, during one of his periodic visits to the Court, in order that I might communicate my evidence and concerns directly to him, without informing my own hierarchy.  (After reflecting, I backed out of this arrangement, since I wished to pursue my dispute with my hierarchy through official channels, and did not want to embarrass anybody or act without the knowledge or permission of my managers.  Shortly thereafter, Mr [H] communicated officially to my hierarchy that OLAF had expressed a general interest in the topic of cigarette company penetration of Commission services; and had requested the dossier which my hierarchy had earlier refused to send.)  From this, I deduce that Mr [H] and OLAF are close; and that both are content to operate via non-official channels. 

The hypothesis’ second assumption, derived from the above, is that the decision-making hierarchy of OLAF is also masonic.  In my perception, only this explains why UCLAF/OLAF did not pursue the “Quatraro Case” or the “China” case; why freemason Mr [R] should use false means to protect OLAF’s reputation; why freemason Mr [H] – in normal circumstances, a very correct official – should be prepared to engage with OLAF via non-official channels; and why Mr [R] should have been so content that the Court had been persuaded to invite OLAF to investigate my allegations.

It should not be understood from the above that I perceive freemasons to be “everywhere” in the institutions.  Rather, it would make sense for an organisation committed to secrecy, and mutual aid for its members, to concentrate its endeavour on placing “brothers” in positions of influence within the Community’s control bodies.  Once in place, such persons can secure the appointment of other “brothers” at more junior level, to implement measures to benefit freemasonry, and to secure the succession.  Most importantly, since the Court and OLAF constitute the ultimate control bodies for external and internal wrong-doing respectively, influence/control over the Court and OLAF would permit freemasonry to ensure protection of every brother mason working in the institutions.  This would be highly desirable for an organisation in which members engage in such activities as attributing false statements to others and intercepting mail. 

If Director General [X] is a freemason, then this can explain:  the Commission’s failure to pursue its own investigation beyond the death of Mr Quatraro (responsible: Mr [X]); why both Messrs [H]/[R] and UCLAF/OLAF did not pursue the obvious risk of Mr [X]’ involvement in the “Quatraro Case”; why Mr [H] did not submit the “China” case in writing; why OLAF refused to investigate the “China” case; why UCLAF/OLAF failed to provide full information on the “Quatraro Case” to Mme Theato; and why the Court did not challenge the completeness of the account given to Mme Theato.

It would be consistent with the hypothesis, if Mr Quatraro was also a freemason.  In my perception, this would explain both why Mr Quatraro acted in the manner in which he did, and why all follow-up of his death was so superficial.  However, it is not essential to the viability of the hypothesis to assume that Mr Quatraro was a freemason; it is conceivable that he could have been coerced/manipulated/bribed into corrupt acts by his hierarchical superior, Mr [X]. 

Mr Quatraro was already wealthy, does not seem to have profited (and if he did, he gave it away as political donations), and in dealing with very dangerous associates, he took huge risks (presumably for his family in Italy, as well himself).  It is not likely that Mr Quatraro’s corruption resulted from intimidation by the mafia – no hint of corrupt behaviour is associated with any previous or subsequent head of the tobacco division.  And no-one in his position, with his knowledge, would have trusted in a bilateral deal with companies which he must have known were linked to the mafia.  He would have known that involvement in any bilateral deal would have been certain to expose him to future blackmail, extortion and worse.  A bilateral deal with a relative, or a very trusted friend, is conceivable – but a bilateral deal with the most notorious criminals in Europe?

Such behaviour was only logical – and the evidence is that Mr Quatraro was in full possession of his faculties, at least until his final day – if Mr Quatraro believed that he enjoyed some form of  “protection”.  That is, before beginning the fraud, Mr Quatraro must have believed that he would be safeguarded by some third party or parties. 

In this context, Mr Quatraro would have known that he needed hierarchical support within the institution – or at least, some assurance of non-intervention – given the unorthodox nature of the financial practices he would be engaging in over an extended period of time.  From the later investigation, it seems that the character of the corruption would have immediately aroused suspicions by an even casual review of the contract award documentation (e.g., “competing” bids featured identical hand-writing, and were recorded as being received within a few minutes of each other, at the same location).  Such inept fraud suggests Mr Quatraro was very inexperienced and/or confident.  The most obvious likely source for such hierarchical support is Mr [X], since it was he who authorised the unique sales procedure for tobacco.  However, even a trilateral deal would not have been viable; it would similarly have exposed Mr [X], as well as Mr Quatraro, to future blackmail and extortion by the mafia.  

It is necessary, then, if the hypothesis is to be viable, to identify a reason why the “Commission” side of the corrupt deal-making should trust in the “mafia” side;  i.e., a reason why the “Commission” side could believe that it was safe to engage in a corrupt deal with the most notorious criminals in Europe, without risk of being compromised at a later date.  The only reason which I can identify as conceivable, is that the deal was mediated, sanctioned and endorsed via masonic guarantee. 

If it is the case that the corrupt deals between Mr Quatraro and tobacco processing companies were masonic in nature, then all the events described above become readily explicable.  But is it credible, that senior public servants in the early 1990’s could become involved with the Italian mafia?

An Italian Parliamentary enquiry (Commissione Parlamentare d’inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali, Relazione sui rapporti tra mafia e politica, p59, Rome, 1993; quoted in Umberto Santino, “Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe against mafia and organised crime”, p13), reached this conclusion: 

“The committee feels that the link between Cosa Nostra and [Italian] institutions is mostly through the ‘Massoneria’ [freemasonry]…  The fundamental terrain on which the link between Cosa Nostra with public officials and private professions was created and reinforced is the Massoneria.  The Massoneria bond serves to keep the relationship continuous and organic.  The admission of members of Cosa Nostra, even at high levels, in Massoneria is not an occasional or episodical one, but a strategic choice… the Massoneria associations offer the mafia a formidable instrument to extend their own power, to obtain favours and privileges in every field; both for the conclusion of big business and “fixing trials”, as many collaborators with justice have revealed”.

The most spectacular case involving masonic subversion of Italian national institutions was the “P2” conspiracy, which came to light in 1981.  The activities of Lodge P2 gave rise to Italy’s biggest post-war scandal; the conspiracy’s corruption, blackmail, murder and sheer scale rocked the Italian establishment and brought down the government. 

The defenders of freemasonry – Mr [R] and I discussed this case –  maintain that P2 constituted “irregular” masonry; consequently, it is improper to tarnish “mainstream” freemasonry with P2 association.  However, a 1984 Italian parliamentary report, “Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sulla Loggia Massonica P2”, reached a less sanguine assessment (reported in Martin Short’s “Inside the Brotherhood” of 1990, the follow-up to Knight’s work,  p543 et seq):  P2 represented a secret, elite lodge approved at the highest level by the national masonic association, the Grand Orient; which was itself recognised by other national associations, including Britain’s Grand Lodge. 

P2, established in 1877 but moribund with only 14 members in the mid-1960’s, was revived and developed by former Grand Master Gamberini “as a nexus for the Italian Right to seize control of Italian society, if the need arose”; by 1980, under its Venerable Master Licio Gelli, it had over a thousand members, drawn from the highest strata of Italian society.  Some members joined because of commitment to the lodge’s aims; “Others joined the Lodge because Gelli used ruthless blackmail.  The ‘masonic dues’ Gelli extracted from the brethren of Lodge P2 were not primarily financial.  What the Venerable Master demanded – and got – were secrets:  official secrets which he could use to consolidate and extend his power, and personal secrets he could use to blackmail others into joining his Lodge.  This most sensitive information from all areas of government was passed to him by his members, who seem to have obeyed him with unquestioning devotion… In 1976 [non-P2 mason] Francesco Siniscalchi, made a statement at the office of the Rome Public Prosecutor, alleging that Gelli was involved in criminal activities.  He was ignored, partly because of Gelli’s already formidable reputation, which intimidated two officers responsible for processing the complaint.  Soon after this, Gelli came to the attention of the police after his friend and P2 member Michele Sindona, Italy’s most influential private banker, had fled to the United States leaving financial chaos behind him.  Sindona [was] widely believed to have links with the mafia… Meanwhile in Italy magistrates were still investigating Sindona’s fraudulent activities and also the events behind the murder of the liquidator of his financial empire… Milan magistrates ordered a police raid on [Gelli’s] villa outside Arezzo… Among the documents left behind at the abandoned villa were the membership files of P2.  A list of members drawn up by Gelli contained the names of nearly a thousand of Italy’s most powerful men.  One prosecutor’s report later stated:  ‘Lodge P2 is a secret sect that has combined business and politics with the intention of destroying the country’s constitutional order.’  Among the names were three members of the cabinet including Justice Minister Adolfo Sarti; several former Prime Ministers..; 43 MPs; 54 top civil servants; 183 army, navy and air force officers including 30 generals and 8 admirals; 19 judges; lawyers; magistrates; carabiniere; police chiefs; leading bankers; newspaper proprietors, editors and journalists; 58 university professors; the leaders of several political parties; and even the directors of the three main intelligence services.  All these men, according to the files, had sworn allegiance to Gelli, and held themselves ready to respond to his call.  The 953 names were divided into 17 groupings, or cells, each having its own leader.  P2 was so secret and so expertly run by Gelli that even its own members did not know who belonged to it.  Those who knew most were the 17 cell leaders and they knew only their own grouping” (Knight, p269-278).  Francesco Siniscalchi’s reward from internationally-recognised Italian freemasonry, for his attempt to expose P2 illegality, was expulsion.

The 1984 parliamentary enquiry, discussed in Short, p532 et seq, found “Gelli hosted frequent P2 meetings where the politics of destabilisation and subversion were discussed by police chiefs, army generals, security service bosses and appeal court judges.  He knew this was not orthodox freemasonry: ‘Philosophy has been banished, but we felt we had to do this in order to tackle only solid and concrete arguments affecting national life’… [and in a note to absent members of P2, Gelli stated]  ‘Many have asked… how we should behave if one morning we awoke to find the clerico-Communists had seized power, whether it would be best to resign ourselves to passive acquiescence, or to take on well-defined positions – and if so, on the basis of what emergency plan’” [p543].  “The 1970s were some of the blackest years in the history of modern Italy.  The state was torn apart by left- and right-wing terror, but many of the horrific acts originally blamed on the Left (from the Red Brigades to the Communist Party) turned out to be acts of black propaganda by the extreme Right.  These included the ‘Italicus’ train bombing in 1974, in which 12 people were killed, and the 1980 Bologna Station massacre in which 85 died.  In both events P2 had a guiding control…” [p545].

The P2 case demonstrates how freemasonry’s respectability, secrecy and routine engagement in covert activities can be used by the unscrupulous as “cover” for corrupt activities.

It should be appreciated that the investigation of P2 was partial and short-lived, and many of its participants remained powerful figures in public life.  Some former P2 Lodge members, such as Silvio Berlusconi, have risen to even higher levels.  (Another member was Mr Gaetano Vita, identified on the P2 membership list as ispettore caporipartizione foreste del ministero dell’Agricultura; I seem to remember this name from sector letters which the Court sent to Italy (addressee?), in respect of “tobacco audit” missions.) 

The P2 affair also demonstrates how rank-and-file freemasons can be misled by their own hierarchies, as to other masons’ earlier wrong-doing.  In March 1987 the English freemasons’ magazine “Masonic Square” incorrectly described the P2 lodge as “bogus… a spurious body not affiliated in any way to the Grand Orient” [Short, p548].  The same absence of openness and accountability which is one of freemasonry’s great strengths vis-à-vis the “profane” (non-masonic) world, is also one of its greatest internal weaknesses. 

Freemasonry has also been a feature of less spectacular corruption than P2.  A major UK public sector corruption scandal of the 1980’s, involving the Property Services Agency, featured masonic links between key participants, and demonstrates the corrupting effect which freemasonry can have on previously law-abiding officials.  “In six successive trials a total of 19 public officials and contractors were convicted of fraud.  Four belonged to the same masonic lodge… The key witness was Michael Hearn, a builder who was also a mason.  In 1967 he joined the Queenswood Lodge [which] had long been a hive of men in the building trade, but by the early 1980’s it had become a honeypot for both contractors and civil servants.  One contractor was 60-year-old Hearn who now says the only way to get work from the PSA was ‘by bribing the civil servants and by ringing [inflating] the contracts’.  Hearn invited another builder named King…  He brought along a PSA technical officer, Eric Wenborn.  King introduced Wenborn to Hearn who encouraged him to join the lodge.  He was initiated in 1981, and King joined a few months later.  The contractors now had the civil servant just where they wanted him.  By October 1983 Wenborn was flying off to Las Vegas, all expenses paid by a crooked Queenswood brother… In June 1988 Wenborn pleaded guilty to five charges of corruption and conspiracy to obtain bribes.  He was jailed for two years… he had worked incorruptibly for thirty-five years until he joined freemasonry” [Short, p524]. 

The above texts are not intended to suggest “guilt by association”; but to demonstrate how freemasonry can be used to arrange and sustain the most daring and ambitious types of fraud and illegality.

In respect of the “Quatraro Case”; if the tobacco division’s corrupt deals were masonic in nature, then all of the events which took place can be explained.  According to the hypothesis:

The motivation of Mr Quatraro becomes explicable.  He can now be viewed as a pawn, rather than a principal.  He did not initiate the fraud.  He was not skilled in fraud; he acted in response to instruction, from his hierarchical superior.  He was confident no harm would come to him; he anticipated protection in return. 

The motivation of Mr [X] becomes explicable.  He sought to generate funds by masonic means; either for personal gain, or for some masonic purpose.  He established a fraud mechanism which avoided any personal risk.  When Mr Quatraro’s irregularities came to light, he entrusted the internal enquiry to a former colleague.  He limited the scope of that enquiry to the activities of Mr Quatraro, since he knew that a wider investigation – even if conducted by a friend – would have been obliged to record that Mr Quatraro both issued tenders and awarded contracts. 

The motivation of Messrs [H]/[R] becomes explicable.  As dutiful freemasons, both would be obliged to protect their brother mason and/or obey masonic instructions to “back off” from an in-depth investigation of the case.  Since the corrupt deals – which were international in character –  would have needed sanction at a high level within the masonic hierarchy, such instructions to Messrs [H]/[R] would have been imperatives.  As one English mason of 35 years remarked [in Short, p186], “Freemasonry is all about due subordination.”  Loyalty to the brotherhood is the highest duty of a freemason; the consequence of disloyalty is social and possibly financial ruin.  In normal circumstances, when either of these auditors “misses” a point during the study of a topic, they are keen that the next study of the same topic examines the point previously “missed”.  But in respect of the “Quatraro Case”, both have discouraged any further examination of the subject.  Both auditors would be aware that anything beyond a superficial examination of the affair, would have raised questions as to the conduct of Mr [X].  This would have risked exposing the masonic nature of the affair.

The motivation of UCLAF/OLAF becomes explicable.  The scope of its “investigation” of the Quatraro Case was no wider than that ordered by Mr [X], and for the same reasons.  A wider examination, the results of which would be reported to a non-masonic readership, would have raised awkward questions as to Mr [X]’ conduct.  If the report to Mme Theato had not omitted key facts, then the European Parliament might have asked for further enquiry to be made into the negligence, or worse, of Mr Quatraro’s superiors.  Such further enquiry would have risked initiating an uncontrollable chain of events which would eventually expose the masonic nature of the corrupt deals in particular, and the influence of freemasonry within the Commission in general.  The motivation for OLAF’s reluctance to enquire into the “China” case also becomes explicable; it may be assumed that this deal was similar in nature to the deals agreed by Mr Quatraro.

The hypothesis then needs to explain:  If the corruption enjoyed the sanction of freemasonry, the mafia, UCLAF/OLAF, senior auditors of the Court, and Mr [X] (at the time, and in reality if not on paper, the most powerful civil servant in Europe, as the Director General responsible for the CAP) – how could it fail?  With such powerful participants, locked together in a strong alliance – how could the corruption come to light?  Why was there no cover-up to protect Mr Quatraro?

The comfortable arrangement was disturbed in the classic manner typical of fraud cases – by the unpredicted.  And by the time the participants knew they had a problem, knowledge of irregularity had already reached a sufficiently large number of non-masonic individuals to make it too late to attempt any cover-up to protect Mr Quattraro. 

As a Director General with many years experience in DG-Agriculture by 1992, Mr [X] possessed immense practical power within his service.  He had far greater relevant knowledge and experience than any of the Commissioners he served; and whereas they had to manage the DG via him, he could manage the DG directly.  It would be reasonable for him to deduce from this that he could provide Mr Quatraro with all the help which the head of the tobacco division might need; and evidently (if the hypothesis is correct), Mr Quatraro felt sufficiently confident of his own position within the Commission to agree to a formal tender/contract award procedure which exposed him alone to the risk of investigation. 

However DG-Agriculture was not monolithic.  Following requests of the Parliament, which were based upon criticisms contained in reports of the Court, the Commission in 1992 had only relatively recently established a new unit within DG-Agriculture, which was tasked with verifying Member States’ accounting for FEOGA expenditure.  The “Clearance of Accounts Unit”, led by a former Court auditor, Mr Brian Gray, visited Member States to ensure that aid was paid correctly to farmers, and that the accounting and control systems operated by Member States were sound. 

By tradition, the DG “served” Member States, and solved their problems.  By contrast, the Unit – which found and reported serious weaknesses in national administration – caused problems for Member States.  Consequently, there was a constant tension between the Unit’s hierarchy, and DG top management.  For example, Mr Gray initially adopted a risk-based approach to his mission programme.  This resulted in a higher-than-average number of visits to Italy and Greece.  These Member States complained to the DG hierarchy that this was unfair.  Mr [X] over-ruled Mr Gray, and obliged him to modify his mission selection.  The DG hierarchy also minimised the impact of the Unit via under-staffing (a source of irritation to the Court and Parliament, which has continued to the present day). 

The Unit was relatively inexperienced; under-staffed; and not tasked with examining Commission affairs, but with verifying Member State propriety.  It could therefore not have been expected, by anybody, to create problems for corrupt deal-making in Brussels by a Commission official.  But the Unit did have a certain degree of autonomy within the DG, since its responsibilities and methods were very different from those of other units; its work was not Brussels-bound; and headed by a professional auditor, a former Court official, its staff had little cause to be obsequious in the normal manner to the DG decision-making elite, of which Mr Quatraro was a member.   

Mr Quatraro – the most woefully inadequate fraudster – forged the signature of a Clearance of Accounts inspector, Mr [O], on a letter sent to Italy.  (Presumably the forgery was designed to cloak one or other of the irregularities committed by the head of the tobacco division). 

Some time later, on mission in Italy, Mr [O] found the letter bearing “his” signature.  The Clearance of Accounts inspector returned to Brussels and not only submitted a formal complaint via his hierarchy; he also made a fuss.  He communicated his outrage widely.  By the time the senior hierarchy of the DG could have been aware of the forgery, knowledge of it was already too widespread to be contained.  Furthermore, the Court of Auditors at this time was carrying out one of its periodic, detailed audits of the tobacco COM.  Mr [O] also brought the forgery to the attention of the Court’s line auditors (not all of whom were freemasons), working in the same building.  This state of affairs made a formal investigation unavoidable. 

The Court’s unfounded claim of credit for uncovering the fraud is a small, but illustrative, example of how freemasonry works; the action had a double impact.  Firstly, it enhanced the reputations within the Court of those identifiable with running the audit; freemasons Messrs [R] and [H].  Secondly, it gave false reassurance to those within and outside the institutions as to the effectiveness of existing control mechanisms.   

Mr Quatraro was removed from the tobacco division pending the outcome of the investigation, but not suspended from his job in the Commission.  If the hypothesis is correct, then initially at least Mr Quatraro must have believed he would be protected by Mr [X], and further freemasons upon whom the latter could call for support.  As Mr Paul Van Buitenen’s book reveals, at this time in the Commission even serious wrong-doing seldom resulted in disciplinary action, let alone criminal proceedings.  Even when apparent evidence of fraudulent tender/contract award proceedings came to light, Mr Quatraro had every reason to believe he would be protected. 

According to the hypothesis:  For the principals involved in the corruption, Mr Quatraro had by now become a substantial liability.  As the corrupt practices were steadily uncovered – and discussed by Court auditors and Clearance of Account inspectors – the concern of the principals must have correspondingly escalated.  Mr [X] would have come under intense pressure from both the “mafia” side of the deal, and the masonic hierarchy, to ensure that the full nature and extent of the conspiracy did not come to light.  For the mafia, it would be better to withdraw from this particular type of activity intact and unseen, than to try to sustain the corruption at the risk of major public exposure and scandal.  For the masons, it would be better to make some sacrifice, than to risk exposure of further freemasons and of the whole structure of masonic influence.  The obvious candidate, who could be blamed for all the irregularities identified to date, was Mr Quatraro.

On the morning of his last day alive, colleagues witnessed Mr Quatraro arguing in an animated manner with several men of southern European appearance, outside the DG-Agriculture building, in the Rue de la Loi, Brussels.  This has been conventionally understood, in the context of the “official version”, as a meeting with the mafia in which Mr Quatraro was told that he was “finished”.  After the meeting, Mr Quatraro seems to have calmed down, and returned to his office.  I am aware of two contradictory accounts of what happened that afternoon, when Mr Quatraro fell to his death in the street below. 

By the first account, Belgian police subsequently found fingerprints on the back of Mr Quatraro’s jacket, indicating that he had been pushed.  I find this account difficult to believe:  even if in principle fingerprints are recoverable from clothing (and I doubt this, having audited the UK Forensic Science Service), it would surely be difficult to distinguish a colleague’s innocent pat on the back, from a murderous push.  However, it is possible that this account has become garbled in the re-telling; and certainly, it is significant by the fact of its existence, since it indicates that contemporaries considered it plausible that Mr Quatraro had been murdered.  And Mr Van Buitenen (in the context of discussing diverse financial irregularities, thankfully not murder) records numerous instances of the Commission failing to provide Belgian authorities with full information in potential criminal cases. 

In this context, it may be observed that the manner of Mr Quatraro’s death – and the mystery surrounding it – mirrors that of the death on 17 June 1982 of the secretary of Roberto Calvi, president of Italy’s Banco Ambrosiano.  Mme Graziella Corrocher – who also kept the books of Lodge P2, of which Calvi was a member – “jumped, or was pushed, to her death from a fourth-floor window at the bank.  She left behind her what was obviously intended to be taken as a suicide note, although there is more than a small doubt that this was genuine” [Knight, p305].  (Calvi died a day later in London, hanged under Blackfriars’ Bridge.  Numerous commentators have “found” masonic symbolism in his demise:  a ‘cable-tow’ around his neck; his pockets filled with rough stone; and in Italy the symbol for the Brotherhood is a Black Friar.)

By the second account, colleagues witnessed Mr Quatraro running between offices on the top floor of the Commission building, in search of a window which would open.  Soon thereafter, Mr Quatraro fell to his death; according to one press report, from the window of Mr Delors’ office.

In my perception, the actions of Mr Quatraro on his final day are not logical, if interpreted via the understanding given by the “official version”.  Since this letter may constitute my only opportunity to discuss the “Quatraro Case” – it will be appreciated, the interests which I transgress in submitting this hypothesis, regardless of whether or not it is correct, are many and powerful – I record here my speculation. 

If the immediate trigger for death by suicide had been his meeting in the street that morning, when he was very animated in discussion; then one might have expected him to make his fatal leap either immediately afterwards (in fact, he fell some hours later); or else, having calmed down (which he did), to choose some more private and less painful method for his later suicide.  In my mind, the one big problem with the “suicide” theory as per the “official version”, is this discrepancy:  between the length of time Mr Quatraro had had to prepare for his suicide; and the very hurried nature of the act. 

If the “official version” is to be believed, Mr Quatraro took his own life as Commission investigators were closing in on damning evidence of his corruption.  If this is the case, then Mr Quatraro had had weeks in which to prepare for suicide.  So brazen were his irregularities, he would have known as soon as an investigation was announced into the forgery, that the enquiry was likely to lead to further incriminating evidence of his fraud.  If it was the prospect of disciplinary and/or criminal procedures which drove Mr Quatraro to suicide; then he might have been expected to have planned a demise more comfortable for himself and more considerate for his family.  If the morning meeting was with the mafia (i.e., if he feared both the mafia and his hierarchy, each acting independently), and the morning meeting acted as the trigger for his suicide; then he might have been expected to put into effect a prepared plan.  But he clearly had no plan; it seems he had not even, in advance, identified a suitable window out of which he could jump.  The “official version”, and the manner of Mr Quatraro’s suicide, seem to be incompatible.

Indeed, it does not seem credible that Mr Quatraro, as a lone fraudster, should have reason to kill himself in response to the prospect of facing disciplinary procedures.  He was in an excellent position to escape harsh penalisation.  He could blame mafia intimidation; threaten to expose his own hierarchy’s failure to control his activities; or offer to reveal all he knew about his corrupt contacts with certain companies.  Alternatively, he could have secured a good lawyer and ‘hush money’ from the mafia. 

However, the hypothesis suggests a different interpretation of the events of Mr Quatraro’s final day.  Although he participated in an animated conversation in the morning, he did calm down; it may be concluded from this that he did not think all hope had gone.  This is explicable if he hoped for continuing support from within the Commission.  Given that later in the day he would again become extremely animated; the logical conclusion is that something happened in the interim, while he was in the Commission building, which caused him to change from a calm state to a very animated state.  The obvious “something”, according to the hypothesis, is that Mr Quatraro received the information that his position would no longer be protected within the Commission. 

Following the hypothesis: this would have come as a severe shock to Mr Quatraro.  Prior to engaging in irregularity, he had a good reputation as an effective Head of Division; a good job, and a comfortable lifestyle.  He had not initiated the fraud, he was not the principal, and so far as has been established, he had not benefitted financially from the irregularities he had committed; he had given money away as donations.  He had been promised protection, and in return he had presumably made a lot of money for other people, and had taken upon himself undivided responsibility for irregularities in awarding tobacco sales contracts.  He would have been deeply shocked.

Even if assurances were given to him that afternoon, regarding financial arrangements and likely criminal charges; presumably only months before, he had heard similar assurances, to the effect that he would never be caught.  And presumably until that day, he had been assured he would never be punished. 

Two possibilities exist concerning what happened next.  The first is Mr Quatraro was so shocked by this betrayal, that in despair, he immediately sought to end his life by the quickest means possible.  The second is that Mr Quatraro was so appalled by this betrayal, that in anger he threatened to expose the entire conspiracy; and this threat resulted in his murder. 

The manner of Mr Quatraro’s death is only compatible with “suicide”, if Mr Quatraro received a fundamental shock on his last day alive; something which he did not expect, and which destroyed his hope.  Neither mafia threat, nor the prospect of disciplinary action, nor even the two combined, could have produced such a fundamental shock.  He would always have known the fickleness of the mafia; and he had lived with the threat of disciplinary disgrace  for many weeks. 

The hypothesis suggests that at the beginning of that fateful day, Mr Quatraro continued to believe he would be protected; in this event, Mr Quatraro would have had no cause to plan his suicide.  He would have believed that in return for the services he had performed, he could expect continued protection.  After all, at the time of his death, he had not even been suspended from his job; he continued to go to work, and to draw his full salary.  But if he learned during the course of one terrible day, suddenly and unexpectedly, that he was to be sacrificed – then this may have constituted a shock sufficiently fundamental to literally push Mr Quatraro over the edge. 

Therefore, from the manner of the act, Mr Quatraro’s death seems only to be consistent with “suicide”, if the hypothesis is valid.

The second possibility, following the hypothesis, is murder; i.e., Mr Quatraro had to be silenced, to address the risk that he would reveal the full extent of the conspiracy.  In order to consider this possibility further, it is necessary to classify those witnesses who claimed to see Mr Quatraro searching for a window which would open, either as mistaken – perhaps he was running to escape pursuers – or as accessories to murder.

It seems unlikely that Mr Quatraro was the victim of a pre-meditated mafia hit.  If the mafia had decided to silence Mr Quatraro, to prevent the detail of their involvement in the fraud becoming known, it might be expected that a lower-profile method would have been selected, rather than throwing him from the top floor of a Commission building in broad daylight.  Even more unlikely is the notion that freemasonic fellow officials plotted to throw their colleague to his death.  If the freemasons planned to silence an individual who posed a threat to a conspiracy involving both themselves and the mafia, then it may be assumed that the task would be passed to the mafia.  However, it is conceivable that Mr Quatraro was the victim of an unpremeditated murder.

To begin with the morning meeting in the street:  if it is the case that the mafia had decided to withdraw from involvement in corrupt dealings in intervention tobacco, and/or to inform Mr Quatraro that he was “finished”; it is highly unlikely that mafia representatives should communicate this in such an open manner – i.e., directly across the street from the Commission building, in full view of witnesses who would later attest to the meeting, and who would later describe their appearance.  It may be assumed that Mr Quatraro had established more private means of communication with the mafia.

However, the persons with whom Mr Quatraro was engaged in animated conversation need not have been mafiosi; but respectable tobacco company representatives.  According to the information received in 2001 by the Court’s auditors, in this period the tobacco processing companies of Europe met regularly in the Europa Hotel, Brussels – directly across the street from the Commission’s building in Rue de la Loi.  By the date of the animated conversation in the Rue de la Loi, Mr Quatraro had been suspended for some time as head of the tobacco division:  therefore he may have been expressing outrage at the allegations which had led to his suspension; or at the manoeuvres which the industry had made just prior to the corruption allegations becoming known outside the Commission – manoeuvres aimed to oust him from the tobacco division, because he was unsympathetic to key companies in the industry.  In any event, the conversation would have given him new information – during his suspension, he was not officially informed of what was happening in his former division, or the industry.

In this version of events, since the morning’s conversation had given Mr Quatraro information which made him angry, he had good cause to see Mr [X] in the afternoon.  Since the meeting in the street was obviously impromptu, Mr [X] would not have anticipated at the beginning of the day that he would be confronted by an upset Mr Quatraro. 

Mr [X] may even have selected a different office from his own for the encounter.  He would have known, or found it easy to confirm, Mr Delors’ absence; and a clandestine meeting between Director General and suspended head of division, would be less likely to be observed or disturbed in the vacant office of Mr Delors.  And if he judged from Mr Quatraro’s request for a meeting that trouble was to be expected; Mr [X] may have ensured he would have supporters present (either masonic colleagues, or mafiosi), to remind Mr Quatraro if necessary as to his responsibilities.
 
Following the hypothesis:  at the meeting, Mr [X] – knowing the steady progress of the investigation, and recognising that he would have to sacrifice Mr Quatraro – would have been obliged to inform Mr Quatraro that he should prepare to be disgraced.  Mr [X] could no longer promise protection for the head of division; the enquiry findings were already too damning.  Mr Quatraro had simply been too crude in his execution of the corruption to escape notice.  At most, Mr [X] could promise Mr Quatraro he would not be harshly dealt with; but the head of division would have to take the blame for corruption. 

By this version of events, Mr Quatraro was faced for the first time with the prospect of ignominy and ruin.  He may have threatened that if this was the reward for all his services to Mr [X], then in return he would take revenge, and earn a lighter punishment, by revealing all he knew of the conspiracy to the authorities.  All Mr Quatraro needed to do to ruin Mr [X], was to walk downstairs to his old office, and tell his story to the replacement head of division; or to the Court auditors working on their study; or to the investigators examining his former files.  This would have placed Mr [X] in a desperate situation.  He was the principal on the “Commission” side of the masonic deal – and therefore responsible for the reliability and good conduct of Mr Quatraro.  If Mr [X] failed to ensure respect for the masonic deal on the “Commission” side, then the other party to the deal – the most notorious criminal organisation in Europe – might consider Mr [X] himself to constitute a danger and a liability.  At the very least, for Mr [X] it would bring disgrace; and public revelation by Mr Quatraro of masonic influence, and masonic cooperation with the mafia, would be disastrous for freemasonry.  Even if Mr Quatraro could be portrayed as a lunatic, inventing tales of a wider corruption in order to distract attention from his own – it would undermine the mutual masonic trust necessary for future “Commission” operations in other markets, such as the “China” deal.  Mr [X] had only a few minutes in which to persuade Mr Quatraro to back down, and take the blame; or take more drastic action. 

By this version, upon the fall of Mr Quatraro, a “cover story” was quickly established for the protection of Mr [X].  After all, Mr [X] had not acted simply in self-interest, but in order to protect the wider interests of freemasonry.  Furthermore, freemasons are skilled in dissembling, which is recognised as an important art; and the P2 case, among many others, shows the ease with which ‘good’ masons can be misled by ‘bad’ masons.  If Mr Quatraro was murdered, then to minimise the risk to the murderer and his associates, and to protect the self-image of freemasonry, it follows that it is extremely unlikely that other masons were ever told the true story of events in Mr Delors’ office.  The most convenient masonic stories would be:  that Mr Quatraro’s deals were “unauthorised”; or that Mr [X] had made a fair offer, to protect Mr Quatraro as far as possible, and to provide financial compensation should he go to prison - but Mr Quatraro was too ashamed to live with the disgrace, and so he jumped.  Masonic loyalty and subordination would ensure a cover-up.    Other masons would believe the masonic version – including Messrs [H] and [R], then engaged in an audit of the tobacco COM.  The responsibility of other masons would then be to ensure no subsequent enquiry was ever made which might reveal that Mr Quatraro’s deals were masonic in nature. 

According to the hypothesis, regardless of how Mr Quatraro died – whether by suicide or murder – he died as the result of his involvement in or with a masonic conspiracy. 

The only certain “winners” in the “Quatraro Case” were the corrupt parties outside the Commission.  Following the revelation of Mr Quatraro’s irregularities in Brussels, investigations were launched by the national authorities of Italy and Greece into the companies which had bought the tobacco sold by the Commission.  OLAF’s letter to the Court in 2001 detailed the legal consequences.  After many years of preliminary examinations by magistrates; no prosecutions have been made, and none are foreseen.  This, too, is inconsistent with the objective facts – the fraud committed so ineptly by Mr Quatraro was quite blatant, and the tobacco buyers were readily identifiable from the tender and contract documentation.  

But it is consistent with the “masonic” hypothesis.  Prosecution of the other parties to the corrupt deals would have risked exposing the full extent of the conspiracy.  The P2 affair shows how the Italian judicial system can be intimidated by mason/mafia influence.  And the claims presented to the Court’s auditors in Greece in 2001 (claims which OLAF appears not to have pursued), by informants who stated they possessed supporting documentary evidence, alleged that national officials had colluded with certain fraudulent tobacco processing companies, so that the latter might escape justice.  In respect of the follow-up actually made by these Member States, OLAF’s 2001 letter identifies the agency’s efforts to encourage prosecution; in fact, the efforts made amounted to no more than a monitoring of the relevant procedures.  According to the hypothesis, it suits everyone – the Commission, OLAF, the Court’s freemasons, the Member States – if the “Quatraro Case” is now quietly closed and forgotten.

If it is assumed that Mr [X]’ motive for potential corruption in the “Quatraro Case” was personal gain, then the hypothesis ends here.  However, one identifiable problem with the credibility of the hypothesis, is in its attribution of corrupt intent to a Community official of the status of Director General; i.e., why should Mr [X] contemplate corrupt involvement – not only in the affair involving Mr Quatraro, but possibly also in the “China” case? 

If it were the case that Mr [X] was engaged in corruption by “masonic” means, then it may be the case that the corruption was not for personal gain, but for purposes which were themselves, “masonic”.  Indeed, the commitment of other freemasons to his protection suggests a thoroughly “masonic” explanation.  In this context, the P2 experience may again be of relevance.  

Post-1945, the United States sought to encourage reconstruction, stable growth and unity among the states of western Europe, in order to serve as a bulwark against Soviet Communism.  Many post-war western European states featured large and confident Communist parties, credited with resisting nazism post-1941; and NATO planners feared that Russian tanks could reach the English Channel in eleven days.  

As part of this general US policy, from 1947 onwards the US Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the CIA, undertook a number of initiatives designed to secure the defence of Western Europe from these twin threats of internal communist subversion and Soviet invasion.   

Freemasonry – persecuted by Hitler, Mussolini and Vichy – was revived in post-1945 continental Europe with the support of US covert agencies.  These encouraged freemasonry as “secret networks” of society’s  powerful: useful for combatting internal communist subversion, by covert as well as overt means; and foreseen as useful for anti-communist civil resistance, in the event of Soviet invasion and occupation. 

US covert agencies were also instrumental in resurrecting the mafia – crushed by Mussolini – as a bulwark against communism in Italy’s impoverished south.  Until c.1970, the mafia fulfilled this role, to which it owed its origins in the nineteenth century:  of combating those enemies of the established order against whom the authorities could or would not act; in return for implicit toleration of their extortion and other rackets.

Further reports suggest that in addition to the above, in post-1945 western Europe US covert agencies funded, equipped and trained potential “partisans”, in preparation for any Soviet invasion:  e.g., in France, the initiative was code-named, “Glaive”; in Britain, “Stay-Behind”; in Sweden, “Sveaborg”; and in Italy, “Gladio”.

The P2 conspiracy was initially attributed to KGB subversion – every Italian political party was compromised by the scandal, with the exception of the Communist Party.  However, this attribution – traceable directly to the Italian secret services, themselves compromised by P2; indirectly to the CIA; and also promulgated by British secret services – was discredited by the following Italian parliamentary enquiry.  Upon the basis of a detailed study of Gelli’s personal history and secret service dossier, the enquiry concluded “that Gelli himself must belong to the secret services, since this is the only logical explanation for the cover they gave Gelli, both in a passive way (not gathering information on him) and an active one (not providing information about him to political authorities who requested it)” (quoted in Short, p550).  However, given that Venerable Master Gelli himself was “puppet-master” of all three of Italy’s secret service chiefs, his status seems to have been greater than merely “national”.  In this light, it can be deduced that P2 owed its origins to US “cold war” policy, in a period when the Italian Communist Party was receiving one third of the electoral vote, and rising in popularity.  This conclusion is consistent with US action following revelation of the conspiracy; pressure was applied on the Italian government by NATO, to keep in post the senior military, naval, air force and secret service chiefs compromised by the scandal, ostensibly due to a need to maintain stability during a period marked by uncertainty in the Middle East.

By the official prosecutor’s interpretation, P2 was established in the politically-volatile 1960s-70s as a state within a state, a network ready to seize power in the event of a Communist election victory, or other undesirable event.  The origin and development of P2 therefore enjoyed the support not only of a substantial element of the Italian political elite; but also of wider, “Western” interests. 

In Germany, freemasonry was revived on anti-communist lines.  One case history of several cited by Short suffices:  “…In 1974 another [ex]Nazi became Grand Master of Germany’s United Grand Lodges.  In 1933 George C Frommholz had resigned from his lodge to join the Nazi Party.  Within a year he was Truppfuhrer in the SS, as surviving Nazi records prove… In 1949 he resurfaced in freemasonry, but the lodge he joined also contained members of the American Army of Occupation who denounced him as a Nazi and had him expelled.  Imagine the surprise of one of these Americans, Major Harvey Brown, when, passing through Berlin in 1962, he learned by chance that Frommholz had become Venerable Master of a Lodge named ‘Zum Totenkopf und Phonix’ (‘Death’s Head and Phoenix’).  Brown… protested against Frommholz’s new masonic career, but this time it was not the SS man who was forced out.  In 1974 the United Grand Lodges of Germany demanded Harvey Brown’s expulsion from a Berlin lodge he had helped found” (p28-9).  In general, post-war US covert agencies protected and secured the careers of many individuals with ex-fascist and ex-nazi credentials, whom they considered to be the most proven and committed anti-communists.  The conflict seen in this case between US Army and CIA interests, is mirrored in respect of the mafia, with conflict between FBI and CIA interests.

The members of P2 associated with extreme right wing groups, now believed responsible for carrying out many of the terrorist atrocities of the 1970’s in Italy, were also associated with “Gladio”. 

For many ex-members, the error of P2 was not in the conception, but in the execution; the good will of the many to protect Italy from communism was undermined by the greed of the few lining their own pockets.  The conspiracy was discredited, because some members used the cloak of secrecy and protection which it offered, to engage in corrupt personal dealings; dealings which ultimately resulted in the raid on Gelli’s villa, and exposure of the membership list and other incriminating documents.  But the idea of an elite, secret masonic grouping with access to covert para-military capability, and pledged to uphold ‘Western’ values, fits neatly into the ‘vision’ which US covert agencies had for European civil society, post-1945.

The “gladio” network also appears to have been active beyond Italy; in the 1980’s Belgium suffered a series of terrorist “supermarket massacres”, which have been linked to members of Belgium’s “gladio-type” operation.  It has been alleged – by a gendarme who worked on the enquiry, since retired – that knowledge of “gladio” unit activity in this period went “to the top”.  Mr Van Buitenen has observed that the Commission’s Security Office – one purchase of which included two sniper rifles, complete with telescopic sights and silencers – had links with shadowy extreme right groups in Belgium, which have never been investigated.    

If the “masonic” element was such a key characteristic of “cold war” US security arrangements in western Europe as the P2 affair and other evidence suggests, then it is hard to see how or why a figure so senior as Director General [X] could or would be involved in a corrupt deal with the mafia, for purely personal gain.  The risk of any such deal coming to the attention of his employers (via secret service knowledge of masonic activities) would surely be too great.

On the other hand:  given the importance attributed to freemasonry in France, both in the higher echelons of public service, and in its secret services; Italian freemasonry’s known interaction with the mafia; the latter’s association with US secret services, directly and/or indirectly via freemasonry and the Italian secret services; and the P2 experience, which shows that at its most daring freemasonry can effectively become  a state within a state:  so therefore, it is conceivable – I do not state, “likely” –  that the corrupt deals by the tobacco division were designed to create funds via the mafia for covert activity in Europe or elsewhere. 

The notion of the “Quatraro Case” taking place in such a context would seem incredible; although the antics of Colonel Oliver North in the broadly-contemporaneous “Iran-Contra” affair would have seemed equally incredible, before their revelation to an astonished public.  North’s unorthodox methods of raising funds were undertaken in order to evade scrutiny by the US Congress of covert funding of unauthorised activities.  Some of North’s illegal transactions were handled by the mafia.  The US Congress in this period might have been expected to query substantial CIA funding of covert activities in NATO-allied European states.  This raises the nightmarish possibility that Mr Quatraro’s corrupt deals were covertly authorised at a very high level, and were designed to fund covert, unauthorised, but masonically-approved activities via the mafia.  This possibility identifies Mr [X] as an asset of the CIA; probably unaware that the “European” freemasonry benefitted by the fraud is an integral part of US security arrangements in continental Europe. 

My intent here is not to shock:  it would surely be entirely logical – and good realpolitik – for the US to endeavour to secure a covert hold over the most powerful official in Europe; and the obvious way to do so, would be indirectly, in a manner by which the subject was unaware of the hold upon him. 

Clearly, the above discussion is a long way from conventional audit; and I am most uncomfortable in presenting such material, being neither skilled nor experienced in such analysis.  I present it in order to demonstrate that, if it were the case that my central hypothesis is valid, then:  the affair may have much wider implications than any typical case of corruption; follow-up would be difficult, given the covert nature of any conspiracy; and follow-up would be potentially dangerous, given the significant interests and capabilities of the parties potentially involved. 

Ideally, before presenting the hypothesis I should have preferred to do further work – test certain facts and refine certain assumptions – and if necessary in consequence, amend or even reject the hypothesis.  Unfortunately in present circumstances this is not possible.  The hypothesis may, at first reading, seem to represent the worst form of sensationalist, “conspiracy theory” nonsense; one further element, convinces me otherwise.

It may be imagined that Mr [R], during our hour-long meeting on 28 April 2002, would have been rather curious to know the basis for my belief that a “masonic connection” existed in the “Quatraro Case”.  After all, on 25 April, I gave this as the express reason as to why I was telephoning him.  During that telephone call, I stated that I had had no intention, and had no desire, to confront freemasonry.  I observed that my letters to MEPs had been intercepted, and alleged that this must have been done by freemasons. 

To my knowledge, no-one hitherto has put forward the possibility of a masonic aspect to the “Quatraro Case”.  This is a case in which Mr [R], as Team Leader of the tobacco audit in 1992-93, was deeply involved.  Only he, among the Court’s auditors, has been allowed to read the Commission’s original internal enquiry report.  As a keen freemason, he might be expected to be interested in knowing why I believed a “masonic connection” existed in that case.  As an auditor, he might be expected to be interested in hearing a fresh theory on a mysterious, high-profile case.  And most importantly as my friend, and since I was evidently in some distress, he might be expected to want to find out why I was worrying about masonic involvement in a ten-year-old case featuring a death in suspicious circumstances, in order that he could address and allay my concerns.  But on 28 April, Mr [R] expressed no interest whatsoever in the issue which had led to my telephone call three days before. 

I deduce from this, that the case has masonic sensitivity, and that Mr [R]’s silence on the topic reflected a fear; i.e., if he discussed the matter with me in any detail, then I might find inconsistencies and gaps in whatever “masonic version” he might present.  Since Mr [R] did not know exactly how much I knew about the case, Mr [R] could not know what story to tell, to be convincing.  And from this; I deduce that the significance of freemasonry and/or freemasons in the “Quatraro Case” is material. 

I appreciate, this is rather a lot to deduce from an absence of discussion on the topic; but I consider, when dealing with freemasons who practise dissembling as an art, that it is necessary to build an analysis from minor details, which only appear to be insignificant.  An auditor must analyse the significance of what is absent, as well as the significance of what is present. 

VI.    Further considerations in respect of my letter of 22 April

In the light of the information and analysis presented above, the allegations set out in my letter of 22 April may be reviewed; in particular, the nepotism of certain Members may be re-assessed.  I write frankly, since this letter is already long, and clarity is important; I mean no disrespect by the manner of my expression.

It is the normal practise of the mafia to compromise its outwardly-respectable “assets”, in order to guarantee future cooperation via blackmail; the verb in Italian for this translates as, “to dirty up”.  In the course of her first speech to staff, Mrs Geoghegan-Quinn made reference to a remark which one senior official had made in private upon her arrival at the Court:  “We officials are here to make miracles happen for you”.  The public revelation of this remark clearly embarrassed the official concerned.

It is possible that the sycophancy alluded to in my letter of 22 April may serve a purpose more sinister than simple ingratiation; it may constitute an attempt to “dirty up”.  The possibility exists that senior officials have not only turned a blind eye to corruption, as suggested in my letter of 22 April; but that some have actively encouraged corruption, as a means of obtaining leverage over Members.  For example:  if a Member is persuaded it would not be problematic to employ a relative; and officials consequently secure the appointment of a Member’s relative; then that Member becomes “dirtied up”, and subsequently dependent upon senior officials for continued silence and protection.  Furthermore, such a Member would find it helpful to receive the support of senior officials who are skilled in the art of dissembling, who have the capacity to operate via unofficial as well as official channels, and who are not troubled by bending rules and due procedures.  In short, it is conceivable that corruption of Members is a result of a deliberate masonic “policy”:  e.g., freemasons “arranging” nepotism would receive the gratitude of Members; and freemasons “protecting” nepotism would similarly receive gratitude.  In this version of events the Members appear less as villains, as asserted in my letter of 22 April; and more as victims, indulged and manipulated.  The ultimate purpose of such manipulation, would be to secure increased power for individual freemasons (i.e., promotion of “helpful” officials), and thereby increased power for freemasonry (i.e., highly-placed freemasons would have greater scope both to influence the Court, and to promote lower-placed freemasons, thus ensuring the succession). 

The capability within our institution of a group which is:  clandestine; highly organised; extremely robust; multinational; capable of operating via unofficial as well as official channels, with access to support from officials and confidential information in other institutions, and third party individuals and organisations – is considerable.  An institution where power is dispersed; where day-to-day operations at Member level involve much “secret” diplomacy via intermediaries; where allegiances shift constantly, naturally reflecting different interests and concerns on a succession of different issues, but all undermining collegiate solidarity – such an institution is very vulnerable to manipulation, by any such hidden group of coordinated and capable individuals, sharing information freely with “brothers”, acting together with great loyalty and a solid hierarchy, for pre-determined and undisclosed purposes of mutual benefit.  

In this context, I re-read the critique of the Court’s internal procedures set out in my letter of 22 April.  In that letter, a series of weaknesses are identified, as being the unintended consequences of a lack of strategic direction given by Members.  However:  these very same weaknesses create an environment in which freemasonry can flourish.  For the promotion of freemasonry, the modus operandi of the Commission in the era of Mr Quatraro, and the current modus operandi of the Court, could not be designed better to ensure the promotion of freemasonry, and the well-being of individual masons.

The plethora of internal rules and procedures, the rigidities of organisational structure and communications, the over-lapping roles of different units, with the consequential emphasis on hierarchical prerogatives and responsibilities; all these present challenges to audit achievement, for Members as well as staff.  By contrast with the experience of the “profane”, a freemason can simply pick up the telephone and converse with a brother mason. 

Of course, this may actually benefit the effectiveness of the institution.  Similarly, freemasonry may improve the effectiveness of audit fieldwork.  As any experienced auditor is aware, audit “criticisms” are often of high value to junior auditee management – the officials with whom auditors discuss their findings.  An audit report which identifies system weaknesses, can be used by auditee junior management as third-party evidence to convince their own hierarchy to allocate additional resources to address those weaknesses.  Thus, the audit findings which result from the encounter of a masonic auditor with a masonic auditee, may be more substantial – in real, objective terms –  than an encounter of the “profane”.  On the other hand, the risk is present that such a masonic encounter – in particular, where the auditor is of lower masonic rank than the auditee – may result in important potential findings being missed or distorted, in a manner which would not take place if the auditor were a non-mason. 

In brief, the two great strengths of freemasonry in the institutional context – its secrecy of coordinated action, and its fraternal loyalty which crosses all external as well as internal boundaries – present correspondingly substantial risks to the sound running of the institution, in terms of accountability/transparency and separation of duties/responsibilties.  The evidence available to me, in respect of both the “Quatraro Case” and my own experience post-22 April, strongly suggests that such risks have been realised. 

In order to assess the reliability of the evidence presented as fact in respect of the hypothesis, I suggest the most informed official in the Court is my Team Leader on the tobacco audit.  If the facts presented herein are deemed reliable, I would suggest prompt recovery of the “China” file.  If, on the basis of such consideration, it is assessed that the performance of OLAF is open to question, or the hypothesis is otherwise supported; I would suggest referring the matter to the Belgian authorities. 

VII.   Conclusion

At the moment, while I am on sick leave, I experience a temporary respite.  In my perception, the Court has good reason to believe, upon the basis of Mr [R]’s note regarding “dark forces”, that I have become insane.  And the freemasons (if Mr [R]’s account to the “brothers” of his meeting with me on 28 April is accurate) hopefully consider me to be too confused, too frightened and too incoherent, to pose an immediate threat.  The Court has certainly done its best to discredit me; publicly denying all my allegations, publicly promising disciplinary procedures, and off-the-record insisting that I am as mad as a hatter.  By contrast, in its private treatment of me as a sick official, I should like to record here my appreciation of the humane manner in which I have been dealt with by the institution.

However, if I remain indefinitely on leave and silent, I assume I will be compulsorily retired on medical grounds.  In that event, the freemasons – among whom I count the mafia, on the basis of the findings of the Italian parliamentary enquiry – might be fearful that in bitterness, I would “paint a picture” of masonic/mafia involvement in the “Quatraro Case”.  In order to address such a risk, it might be decided that I was so depressed after losing my job and my mind that I committed “suicide”.  The death of a sacked, deranged, former official would raise fewer questions, than the demise of a serving official who only recently presented allegations of corruption against his institution.  After all the public fuss has diminished, I may become perceived as a “loose end”.  I consider the probability of such an event to be low; but present.  There have already been two “suicides”; Mr Quatraro’s son also died, soon after his father.  I deduce from the above, that continued silence is not a viable option. 

Furthermore, if my hypothesis is correct, then there is a risk that Commission freemasons have or are engaged in a whole series of similar corrupt dealings with the mafia and/or other commercial enterprises, under masonic auspices.  There may be many more reasons for me to be silenced than are identified in this letter.

If I return to work without public acknowledgement by the Court that my allegations of 22 April are soundly based, then I assume I will be disciplined, and possibly bankrupted by Mr [B]’s claim of defamation.  Again, such an outcome may be interpreted by masons or mafia to imply I am likely to become sufficiently desperate and/or bitter, to be ready at any moment to “paint a picture” in public.  Again, the consequences of such a perception might be unfortunate. 

Of course, murder is only the most extreme form of reprisal available to the parties featuring in the hypothesis.  Equally effective, in terms of undermining my well-being and credibility, would be to have me “framed” for some fictitious illegality.  Liaison with law enforcement bodies is an OLAF responsibility; and law enforcement bodies are famous for freemasonry.  This consideration accounts for part of my reluctance to leave the UK; I might find something “unexpected” in my car, or my suitcase, when I cross a frontier.  This concern will remain at least until such times as my allegation of masonic corruption is publicised and/or investigated.

In any event, I have deposited copies of this letter in a number of secure locations, and taken measures to ensure publication in the event of my untimely demise or incarceration.  In respect of certain of these, I have “taken myself out of the loop”; i.e., I am unable to countermand publication in such event.  This is a safeguard against any ill-intent of third parties, who may possess persuasive methods of obliging me to order destruction of the letters.  

The above may seem over-dramatic.  However, the evidence available to me indicates that the Court is corrupt, OLAF protects corruption, the Ombudsman is useless, the Parliament’s administration is subject to improper influence, the mafia is involved; and two individuals, including a serving official, have died as the result of “suicide”.  The only novel aspect of my hypothesis, is to suggest that the above phenomena are connected.  I have no desire to constitute the next “connection”.    
 
Due to the public response of the Court to my allegations – in particular, the repeated references to “obvious factual mistakes” in my letter, references which imply I am a bad auditor as well as a trouble-maker – I currently possess very little of the public credibility which I perceive to be essential to my continued and long term physical well-being.  Given the impossibility, now, of the Court dropping disciplinary procedures against me, publicly acknowledging the existence of some merit in my original allegations, investigating OLAF in general and the “Quatraro Case” in particular, and persuading Mr [B] not to claim my Mercedes – this means that I have no realistic alternative but to substantiate my original allegations to the Parliament in a further letter, in the hope of public vindication.  I hope it will be understood that my intent is not malicious; I am sure the Members would be appalled to know of my current predicament.      

I will also make reference to my general concern regarding OLAF; I need to account for why I did not send my original letter to that agency, choosing instead to disturb MEPs.  I also need to bring the issue of freemasonry into the open, in order to raise awareness of – and thereby address as best I can – the risk of future covert sabotage of my allegations, reputation and physical well-being.  Hopefully, ‘good’ masons will query why they should harm me; and ‘bad’ masons will recognise a risk of closer scrutiny.

Thereafter, if vindicated, the route of minimum risk which I can identify and which I should like to pursue, is to return to FED division to continue with the work I left on 18 April.  In this event, my untimely demise would be a matter of some public scandal; I believe this would be a powerful disincentive to any ill-intent.  And if I do not return to Luxembourg eventually, in order to give every opportunity for harm to come to me; then I fear I will spend the rest of my life looking over my shoulder – for something which, in the final analysis (since the hypothesis is not a proof), might not even be there. 

I can appreciate the institutional hierarchy would have grounds for concern over my future reliability.  However, I can assure this will not be problematic, since I will not wish to be dead.  Any further “initiative” on my part – internal to the institution, as well as external – could be interpreted by third parties as indicative that I would soon “paint a picture” in public.  DAS audit of FED may not be the most gripping subject, but so far as I am aware no auditee, let alone auditor, has ever fallen out of a window.  I have no wish to be personally involved in any pursuit of the “Quatraro Case”.  In any event, in the longer term I would envisage leaving the institution, and returning to Scotland.  My wish is to be seen by third parties to have no reason to feel aggrieved at the institution; to be seen to be contentedly at work in Luxembourg; and, after a decent interval, to find a new job.   

Correspondingly, I have no enthusiasm for an interrogation by OLAF.  I consider that agency – not necessarily the officials responsible for the enquiry into the Court, but OLAF as a body corporate – to be utterly compromised and unreliable.  I have no doubt that OLAF investigators, experienced and trained in interrogation, would quickly obtain from me all of the information which I present here; and I further believe – rightly or wrongly – that such information would equally quickly be provided to unauthorised third parties.  Given that such third parties dispose of a range of punitive measures even more fiendish than withdrawal of pension entitlements, I have no wish to cooperate with any OLAF enquiry.

I regret to have to bring such problematic matters to your attention.  As noted, I had hoped to be able to discuss this matter in person with an official of the Administration; however, I understand this was not possible.  Due to the capabilities of OLAF, considered along with well-documented masonic influence over law-enforcement bodies, I wished to avoid the risk of telephone surveillance; I was therefore unable three weeks ago to provide any explanation as to why I wanted such a meeting.  I am aware how odd such concern over surveillance must seem; however, at the time I had written down nothing of my hypothesis.  Given the range of participants identified within the hypothesis, their collective technical capabilities, and the gravity of the case involved; I simply opted to be very prudent indeed, at least until such times as I had committed my hypothesis to paper. 

I am aware that if the hypothesis is considered as a piece of audit work, it is incomplete in the execution.  I had no idea on 22 April that such a linked interpretation of events would fall into place; and since 22 April, for obvious reasons, I have been unable to verify facts in the normal manner.   

Last week, I was informed that several of my colleagues in the Court have received an e-mail from watt100000@yahoo.com, reading “Stay tuned”, and with a pop music attachment.  I should like to make clear that I have no association with these mails; I do not even hold an account with Yahoo, nor have I suggested or requested that any third party undertake this initiative.  The hoaxer would appear to have “inside knowledge”, since the two individuals whom I know to have received mails (…) are both associates of mine.  In the circumstances, I suggest that the mail is checked for viruses.  I also request that the Court ask Yahoo to identify the time/location from which the account bearing my name was set up.  I suspect this hoax is intended either to embarrass friends of mine who might reply, to obtain confidential information, and/or to discredit me. 

A closing remark, illustrative of my current situation and concerns.  My lawyer received a fax from OLAF investigators, who expressed a willingness to interview me, even in Scotland.  He sent a reply.  Then my lawyer was surprised to receive a telephone call; at home, in the evening, from an OLAF investigator who wanted to “know more” about my health.  Perhaps the late hour, and calling my lawyer at home, signifies only that the investigator is inconsiderate, and works very long hours (given the one hour time difference).  Or perhaps the investigator is aware that many British lawyers are freemasons; and that some lawyers routinely record all their office telephone calls.  Perhaps the investigator wanted to make a masonic greeting to my lawyer, to find out if he is “on the square” and so obtain confidential information, without risk of being recorded and subsequently exposed.  I think, if I were paranoid, then I would deduce this event was evidence of freemasonry at work.  Instead, I merely observe yet another oddity, another possible indication of masonic involvement.  I conclude, I am not paranoid; only terrified.  

Yours faithfully,

R Dougal WATT
Auditor
17 June 2002
(On sick leave)

Note: This letter was published as a JUST Response exclusive report on September 23 2002.

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